The Judgment Fund: America\u27s Deepest Pocket & Its Susceptibility to Executive Branch Misuse by Figley, Paul F.
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2015 
The Judgment Fund: America's Deepest Pocket & Its 
Susceptibility to Executive Branch Misuse 
Paul F. Figley 
American University Washington College of Law, pfigley@wcl.american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the Torts 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Figley, Paul F., "The Judgment Fund: America's Deepest Pocket & Its Susceptibility to Executive Branch 
Misuse" (2015). Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 1242. 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1242 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ 
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & 
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
145 
THE JUDGMENT FUND:   AMERICA’S DEEPEST POCKET & ITS 
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH MISUSE 
Paul F. Figley* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 146 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES’ PAYMENT OF
CLAIMS & THE CREATION OF THE JUDGMENT FUND .............. 149 
A. The Period of Administrative-Legislative Resolution of
Claims ........................................................................ 150 
B.  The Court of Claims ....................................................... 155 
C.  The Federal Tort Claims Act ............................................ 159 
D.  Creation of the Judgment Fund ......................................... 161 
E.  Normalizing Use of the Judgment Fund .............................. 167 
1.  The Contracts Disputes Act ....................................... 167 
2.  The No FEAR Act ................................................... 169 
3.  The Equal Access to Justice Act .................................. 171 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CLAIMS
PAYMENTS ............................................................................... 175 
A.  The Statements and Accounts Clause ................................ 175 
B.  Statutory Disclosure of Payments ....................................... 176 
III.  ASSESSING JUDGMENT FUND PRACTICES ................................ 179 
A.  Raids on the Judgment Fund ........................................... 179 
1.  Legislative Branch Encroachment .............................. 179 
2.  Executive Branch Encroachment ................................ 180 
a. Executive Branch Authority over the Judgment
Fund .................................................................. 180 
b.  Single Event Settlements ......................................... 184 
* Associate Director, Legal Rhetoric Program, American University Washington College of
Law, where he teaches Torts and Legal Rhetoric. Formerly Deputy Director, Torts
Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice.   My sincere gratitude to Adeen Postar, 
Joseph W. Gross, Katie Wright, John C. Heinbockel, and J. Ryan Sims for their patience
and research assistance.  Thanks also to the staff of the Journal for its excellent work in
improving this Article. 
146 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
c.  “Sue & Settle” Environmental Litigation ................ 186 
d.  Class Settlements & Program Creation ................... 189 
B.  Lack of Transparency ..................................................... 201 
IV.  POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDGMENT FUND PRACTICES .... 207 
A.  Limit Executive Branch Use of the Judgment Fund to Create 
New Claims Programs & Processes .................................. 207 
B.  Increase Transparency .................................................... 208 
1.  Publish Judgment Fund Payments ............................. 208 
2.  Restore EAJA Reporting Requirements......................... 209 
3.  Publish Reports on CDA and No FEAR Reimbursements 210 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 210 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For two hundred years, Congress struggled to find an effective 
method for deciding and paying disputed claims against the govern-
ment.1  It sought to retain control over payments made from the pub-
lic fisc, a responsibility assigned to it by the Appropriations Clause, 
but by a method that did not drown its members in administrative de-
tail.  Its pursuit of these two contending goals led it to try different 
approaches.  By the 1960s, the myriad steps taken by Congress result-
ed in a significant transfer of power that was neither foreseen nor 
sought.2  In the subsequent four decades, Congress followed that 
same path to the point where it has now ceded almost all authority 
over claims payments and greatly reduced its ability to track those ex-
penditures. 
 
 1 “[A] claim against the United States is well understood [to be] a right to demand money 
from the United States . . . which can be presented by the claimant to some department 
or officer of the United States for payment, or may be prosecuted in . . . court . . . .”  
Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 575 (1886); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-08-978SP, 3 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14-10 (3d ed. 2008) [here-
inafter 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW], http://www.gao.
gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf  (noting that the Hobbs decision resolved the question of 
what is a claim). 
 2 See William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 
388 (1968) (“This transfer was not a consciously-sought end in itself; it was brought about 
by responses to needs of the moment.”). 
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The Judgment Fund3 is the mechanism Congress established to 
pay most settlements and judgments against the federal government.4  
The Fund, originally created in 1956 and limited then to paying 
judgments of $100,000 or less, was repeatedly expanded until the 
current, 1977 version that automatically pays settlements and judg-
ments regardless of amount.5  It is “a permanent, indefinite appropri-
ation for the satisfaction of judgments, awards, and compromise set-
tlements against the United States.”6  The Judgment Fund is available 
only under specific circumstances,7 but when available it makes pay-
ments without any review by Congress.8  The government uses it to 
pay out billions of dollars every year,9 yet there is no practical way for 
Congress or the public to track where Judgment Fund money goes.10 
The Judgment Fund sits at the intersection of two longstanding 
policies rooted in the Republic’s foundational documents: legislative 
branch authority over the purse and public accounting of govern-
ment expenditures.  The Constitution addresses them both in Clause 
7 of Article I, Section 9:  “No Money shall be drawn from the Treas-
ury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regu-
lar Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
public Money shall be published from time to time.”11  The first half 
of Clause 7, the Appropriations Clause, was not much discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention.12  The second half of Clause 7, the State-
 
 3 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012). 
 4 See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 to 14-
32 (describing the formation of the Judgment Fund); Jeffrey Axelrad, What is the Judgment 
Fund?, 1 Ann.2004 ATLA-CLE 435 (2004). 
 5 See infra Part I.D. 
 6 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-8. 
 7 See infra notes 141-164 and accompanying text. 
 8 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-94-33, 3 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14-64 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW], http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/196723.pdf. 
 9 See Jenna Greene, Feds Spent Billions to Resolve Suits in 2012; The Judgment Fund, NAT’L L. J. 
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202595862822/Inside-the-
Judgment-Fund?germane=1202595862822&id=1202595810365 (noting that over $4 bil-
lion was paid from the Judgment Fund in 2012). 
 10 See 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 12-6 (noting 
that no one knows the number of claims processed by the federal government each year); 
Jenna Greene, Federal Returns; Records Show Government Paid Billions To Settle Suits Last Year, 
34 NAT’L L.J. ( 2012), 1, 1–2 (explaining that the Judgment Fund has “no fiscal year limi-
tations” and describing the enormous range of payments made in 2011). 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 12 See Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107  
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1248–52 (2009) (chronicling the history of the Appropriations 
Clause); Note, The CIA’s Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L.J. 608, 609–11 (1975) 
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ment and Accounts Clause, was debated; George Mason’s proposal to 
require annual reports of expenditures was opposed by James Madi-
son and rejected.13 
This Article analyzes why it made sense for Congress to create the 
Judgment Fund, why Congress should require better reporting of 
payments made, and why it should consider reasserting some control 
over huge settlements that, in practical effect, create new government 
claims programs.  The Article follows two strands:  Congress’s desire 
to have claims handled by another branch, despite its authority over 
appropriations, and the public’s right to know about government ex-
penditures. 
This Article in Part I examines the history of federal payment of 
claims, the transition from legislative control over that process to cre-
ation of the Judgment Fund, and subsequent congressional efforts to 
have agencies reimburse the Fund for some categories of payments.  
Part II addresses the history of public disclosure of claims payments.  
Part III assesses how the Judgment Fund might be exploited and the 
problems caused by the lack of transparency of its payments.  This 
discussion addresses legislative authority to use the Fund for new 
purposes that may be inconsistent with its original intent, executive 
branch control over its disbursements, and the potential for govern-
ment attorneys, acting for political or personal reasons, to improperly 
help favored claimants by agreeing to unwarranted settlements or by 
pulling punches in litigation.  This Part examines the latter problem 
in the contexts of settlements of single events, “sue and settle” litiga-
tion, and class settlements.  Part IV proposes improvements for the 
Judgment Fund and claims payment practices.  It suggests that Con-
gress consider retrieving its authority to require that the appropria-
tions process be used to fund new claims programs, such as the His-
panic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process the Obama Administration, 
unilaterally established and financed with Judgment Fund money.14  
Part IV also includes several proposals to make reimbursement pro-
cesses and claims payments transparent, retrievable, and public. 
 
 
[hereinafter Note, Secret Funding] (tracing the history of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of 
the Constitution). 
 13 For more detailed descriptions of the debates surrounding Mason’s proposal, and its ul-
timate rejection, see Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154–56 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 618–19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966); Note, Secret Funding, supra note 13, at 609–11. 
 14 See infra notes 416–438 and accompanying text. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES’ PAYMENT OF CLAIMS & 
THE CREATION OF THE JUDGMENT FUND 
The Appropriations Clause puts the power of the purse—the au-
thority to spend public funds—in the hands of Congress.15  The 
Clause requires that Congress pass an appropriation before funds can 
be paid out of the Treasury.16  The Appropriations Clause directly 
pertains to any claim for money damages from the federal govern-
ment.17  It requires a specific funding source for any government 
payment, including settlements and court-ordered judgments.18  
Agency appropriations cannot be used to pay judgments against the 
United States or its agencies, absent specific authorizing legislation.19  
Such legislation could be an appropriation for a particular settlement 
 
 15 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 1647 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 388 F.3d 
405, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425–
27 (1990) and Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937));  see also 
U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(“The Appropriations Clause . . . protects Congress’s ‘exclusive power over the federal 
purse.’” (citing Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1992))); 
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 274–75 (noting 
the view among many Framers that “the pursestrings should be in the hands of the Rep-
resentatives of the people”); Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 1253, 1259 (describing 
the importance of the legislature having control over the public purse). 
 16 Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 428 (1990); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. 
United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850);  see 
also Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1357 (1988) (discussing con-
stitutional principles of the public fisc and of appropriations control). 
 17 See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 1262–67 (discussing the connection between the 
Appropriations Clause and federal sovereign immunity for money damages); see also John 
F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 437 n.192 
(2010) (“The most plausible textual source for federal sovereign immunity [from money 
damages] is the Appropriations Clause . . . .”). 
   The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a sovereign state can be sued only 
to the extent that it has consented to be sued and that only its legislative branch can give 
such consent.  See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (“If any principle 
is central to our understanding of sovereign immunity, it is that the power to consent to 
such suits is reserved to Congress.”); accord United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 
U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (“Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign.”). 
 18 Richmond, 496 U.S. at 432 (“[F]unds may be paid out only on the basis of a judgment 
based on a substantive right to compensation based on the express terms of a specific 
statute.”); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-30 
to 14-32 (noting that the Appropriations Clause “applies with equal force to payments di-
rected by a court” and citing to Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424–26). 
 19 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-29 to 14-44;  
see also Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2194 n.9 (2012) (noting that 
the Appropriations Clause does not bar recovery where a specific statute establishes a 
right to compensation from the Judgment Fund); Cnty. of Suffolk v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 
135, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (observing that the legal basis for an award under the Judgment 
Fund must be found elsewhere in the law). 
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or judgment, a general appropriation for categories of settlements or 
judgments, or a statute that authorizes payments from a pre-existing 
appropriation.20  If Congress chose not to appropriate money to pay a 
judgment, the judgment would not be paid.21  Accordingly, until 
Congress had enacted an applicable waiver of the United States’ sov-
ereign immunity, the federal government could not be sued for dam-
ages.22 
A.  The Period of Administrative-Legislative Resolution of Claims 
The absence of an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity in the 
early Republic23 did not leave citizens without a remedy.  The First 
Amendment gave each citizen the right “to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”24  Individuals used that right to seek pri-
vate legislation granting them financial remedies for claims against 
the government.25  From the outset, Congress directly resolved indi-
vidual claims with legislation.  The first such bill was passed in Sep-
tember of 1789.26  More than 700 petitions were presented to the First 
Congress.27  Congress organized itself to process such claims.28  In 
 
 20 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 to 14-32; 
see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 388 F.3d at 409 (discussing the different forms congres-
sional appropriations can take). 
 21 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962) (recognizing a 1933 study that found 
fifteen instances in seventy years in which Congress did not appropriate money to pay a 
judgment); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-
31 (citing Glidden). 
 22 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (“Thus, except as Congress has con-
sented to a cause of action against the United States, ‘there is no jurisdiction . . . in 
any . . . court to entertain suits against the United States.’” (quoting United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941)); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 
(1846) (“[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by 
law.”). 
 23 The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not waive sovereign immunity.  See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be com-
menced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize 
such suits.”). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25 Bills to Provide for the Adjustment of Certain Tort Claims Against the United States:  Hearings on 
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 24–25 (1942) 
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463] (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Francis M. Shea); see also James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private 
Bills:  Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1862, 1889–92 (2010) (discussing the common nature and ease of petitioning for private 
payments). 
 26 See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States:  The Evolution from a 
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 638 (1985). 
 27 Id.  
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1794, the House established the Committee on Claims and later es-
tablished other committees for specific categories of claims.29  The 
Senate did likewise.30 
Congress did try other mechanisms for resolving claims.  Begin-
ning in 1784, the Confederation Congress had used a three-member 
Board of Treasury to hear claims against the national government 
and report back to Congress.31  Maintaining a tight rein on the Board 
and each claim, the Confederation Congress kept control over pay-
ments.32  When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, Congress 
adopted a similar approach.33  It established commissions and audi-
tors to evaluate claims, but retained the authority to decide whether 
and how much to pay.34  The statute that established the Department 
of the Treasury provided for Treasury auditors to receive and exam-
ine claims, and then forward them to the Comptroller for final deci-
sion.35  The congressional committee system and the Treasury De-
partment system complemented one another, with Treasury handling 
routine contract matters while Congress dealt with non-contract mat-
ters and appeals of Treasury determinations.36  Undisputed claims 
could be paid promptly.37  The only recourse for those whose claims 
were denied was to petition Congress for relief.38 
 
 28 Both the Continental Congress and the Congress of the Confederation established con-
gressional committees to deal with claims.  See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-3 to 14-4. 
 29 See Shimomura , supra note 26, at 644 (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 883 (1794), H.R. REP. 
NO. 730, at 2–3)). 
 30 Wiecek, supra note 2, at 392. 
 31 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 469–71 (G. Hunt ed., 1928). 
 32 See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 634–35 (describing how the Confederation controlled 
the Board “at almost every point”). 
 33 See 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS:  A HISTORY, PART II:  
ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, JURISDICTION, 1855–1978, at 2, 4 (1978). 
 34 See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 388 (characterizing this as the “executive-administrative 
phase”); see also Shimomura, supra note 26, at 635–37 (noting that this approach was con-
sistent with the prior practice of most colonial legislatures). 
 35 See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 5, 1 Stat. 65, 66–67 (“[I]t shall be the duty of the Auditor 
to receive all public accounts, and after examination to certify the balance, and transmit 
accounts with the vouchers and certificate to the Comptroller for his decision there-
on . . . .”); COWEN, supra note 33, at 4 (“The exact role of the Treasury in processing the 
claims is unclear and was unclear even at the time.”); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 389 (ex-
plaining that section 5 of the act establishing the Treasury Department instructed its Au-
ditor to receive all claims and forward them to the Comptroller); see also Act of Mar. 3, 
1817, ch. 45, § 2, 3 Stat. 366, 366 (setting forth procedures for the “prompt settlement of 
public accounts”). 
 36 See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 644–45 (describing the “two general but separate claims 
systems” operated by Congress and the Treasury Department). 
 37 See Charles C. Binney, Origin and Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government in the 
United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 372, 378 (1909) (“As soon as the Treasury Department was 
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Congress tried different administrative approaches for handling 
disputed claims.  A 1792 statute pertaining to claims for Revolution-
ary War pensions called upon circuit courts to consider evidence, 
reach conclusions, and forward them “to the Secretary of War, to-
gether with their opinion in writing….”39  The statute further provid-
ed that if the Secretary suspected a mistake, he was to withhold pay-
ment and report the matter to Congress.40  The question of whether 
Congress could require judicial officers to make such advisory opin-
ions reached the Supreme Court in Hayburn’s Case,41 but before an 
opinion was rendered, Congress amended the statute to require the 
courts to only take evidence and forward it to the Secretary of War.42 
An 1816 statute for property claims arising from the War of 1812 
provided for the appointment of a single commissioner whose deci-
sions in favor of claimants were final and binding on the govern-
ment.43  The commissioner was so generous in his awards that Presi-
dent James Madison suspended the commission’s proceedings until 
Congress could reconsider the grant of authority.44  Congress amend-
ed the statute to require review by the Secretary of War for all awards 
over $200.45  The problems raised by this profligate commissioner ad-
 
established, the accounting officers were daily occupied in paying what the government 
owed for contracts of all kinds.”). 
 38 See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 389 (“If a claimant was dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Comptroller, his only recourse was to petition Congress.”). 
 39 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244. 
 40 Id. § 4 (“[W]here the said Secretary shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake, he 
shall have power to withhold the name of such applicant from the pension list, and make 
report of the same to Congress.”); see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 5 n.10 (discussing the 
statute in depth). 
 41 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
 42 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 243; see also Shimomura, supra note 26, at 639 (noting 
that this change apparently resolved the advisory opinion problem). 
 43 See Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 14, 3 Stat. 261, 264 (“And when such judgment shall be 
in favour of such claim, shall entitle the claimant, or his legal representative, upon the 
production of a copy of such judgment . . . to payment of the amount thereof at the 
treasury of the United States.”). 
 44 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 20 (1816);  see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 7 (explaining that Pres-
ident Madison not only suspended these functions but asked Congress to “more clearly 
define the scope of [the special commissioner’s] duties under the Act”); Wiecek, supra 
note 2, at 389–90 (noting that President Madison suspended the commissioner’s “func-
tions after less than a year of operations”). 
 45 Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 110, § 5, 3 Stat. 397 (“[A]ll claims allowed by said commissioner, 
of two hundred dollars or upwards, shall be revised by the Secretary of War . . . and may 
be confirmed or rejected.”); see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 7 (discussing changes to the 
1816 Act in detail). 
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versely influenced Congress’s willingness to grant other tribunals the 
authority to make binding judgments on disputed claims.46 
Initially, claims payments were made from general appropria-
tions.47  As Congress increasingly specified the permissible uses of 
particular appropriations, claims that had been approved but did not 
fall within those specifications could not be paid until a suitable ap-
propriation was made.48  Accordingly, parties whose claims had been 
approved might not be paid for some time.49 
From the 1820s to 1855, claims were resolved principally through 
the congressional claims process.50  Initially, the system seemed to 
function adequately,51 but dissatisfaction grew in Congress because of 
the legislative time spent on claims and the poor results that were ob-
tained.  In 1832, John Quincy Adams argued that deciding private 
claims “is judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought to have 
nothing to do with it.”52  In 1838, the House Committee on Claims is-
sued a report on the congressional claims system.53  It noted that the 
first three Congresses received 2,317 petitions, while the three Con-
gresses immediately preceding the report received 14,602 petitions, 
of which only 5,891 were “[a]cted on” at all,54 and only 603 “[p]assed 
both Houses.”55  The committee recognized that claims were delayed 
and lingered from one session to another.56 
 
 46 See COWEN, supra note 33, at 7–8 (“Experience with the commissioner under the 1816 Act 
may have affected the thinking of members of Congress for many years on the wisdom of 
delegating final authority to make awards.”); see also Wiecek, supra note 2, at 390 (detail-
ing the reluctance of Congress to “part with control over the federal purse-strings”). 
 47 See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-5. 
 48 See id. at 14-6 (“[I]t was possible for Congress to refuse to appropriate the funds for a giv-
en judgment, leaving the judgment creditor with a valid entitlement against the United 
States but no funds legally available to satisfy it.”). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See COWEN, supra note 33, at 8 (noting that after 1817, Congress considered many claims 
independent of the Treasury Department); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 388 (characterizing 
this period, beginning in the 1820s, as the “legislative phase”). 
 51 See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 392 (noting that there was “no widespread agitation for a re-
form of claims procedures”). 
 52 8 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Entry of Feb. 23, 1832, in MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 
COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 480 (Charles Francis Adams 
ed., 1876) (“One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by [private bills], and there is 
no common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided.  A deliberative assembly is the 
worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice.”). 
 53 H.R. REP. NO. 730 (1838). 
 54 Id. at 4–5. 
 55 Id. at 5. 
 56 See id. at 8 (“Claimants and agents persevere in renewing their applications, year after 
year, until the loss of time and expenses absorb the entire amount of a small claim.”). 
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In 1848, the House Committee on Claims issued another report 
on the claims system, updating the statistics from the 1838 report:  
“[D]uring the ten years embraced in these five Congresses, out of 
16,573 petitions of private claimants to the House of Representatives, 
and 3,436 bills reported, only 1,796 passed the House, and but 910 
passed both Houses.”57  The 1848 report noted other problems in-
cluding, inter alia, unjust delays, ex parte testimony, gaming of the 
committee system to find a favorable forum, and manipulation to 
“procure passage of claims having no merit whatever.”58  It com-
plained that private claims consumed one third of the time of the 
House of Representatives.59 
In the early 1850s, the scent of scandal increased the momentum 
for change.  Claims were jumbled and confused; Congress paid one 
$7000 claim twice.60  Congressmen degraded their office by acting as 
claims representatives.61  The potential for bribery was real and ever-
present.62  In December of 1854, Senator Richard Brodhead, speak-
ing in favor of a bill to create a board of commissioners to decide pri-
vate claims, summarized problems of the old system, including:  the 
postponement of “honest claims”; the expenditure of time; the diffi-
culties of a legislative body deciding “facts of a case”; the constant 
pressure from “private claimants, and their agents or attorneys”; and 
the unseemliness of “private claims [being] either passed or pressed 
into the appropriation bills the last nights of our sessions, contrary to 
the rules of the Senate, and injurious to the character of Congress.”63 
 
 57 H.R. REP. NO. 498, at 4 (1848). 
 58 Id. at 5–6. 
 59 See id. at 6–7. 
 60 See CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1854) (statement of Sen. John M. Clayton) (de-
scribing the twice-paid claim); COWEN, supra note 33, at 12 (same). 
 61 See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1849) (statement of Rep. Andrew Johnson) 
(complaining of “notices which . . . even members of Congress had put in the newspa-
pers, proposing to prosecute claims against the Government of the United States”); see al-
so Wiecek, supra note 2, at 395 (“Government officials, including Senators and Congress-
men themselves, became part-time claims representatives.”). 
 62 See CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 2100 (1852) (noting the unanimous consent given 
to the appointment of a Senate committee “to inquire into abuses, bribery, or fraud, in 
the prosecution of claims before Congress”); COWEN, supra note 33, at 12–13 (describing 
“an atmosphere that was ripe for scandal”); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 395 (explaining that 
the potential problem of bribery of lawmakers was openly discussed). 
 63 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1854) (statement of Sen. Brodhead). 
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B.  The Court of Claims 
Finally, in 1855 Congress acted.  It passed the Court of Claims 
Act,64 marking the first step towards a system in which claims would 
be heard by judges.65  The original Court of Claims was empowered 
to:  hear claims based on federal laws, regulations, or contracts; 
promulgate its own rules; issue subpoenas; and take evidence.66  The 
statute provided that government attorneys defend the United States 
and that both parties could cross-examine witnesses.67  The court 
lacked authority to enter final judgments; instead, it forwarded re-
ports and draft bills to Congress for enactment.68  Money to pay 
claims came from enactment of specific bills.69 
When it received the first reports from the Court of Claims, the 
House debated whether to deal with them as final judgments ready to 
be paid, or as proposals to be sent to the various claims committees 
for extensive review.70  It chose to send them to the committees, effec-
tively treating the new court as an advisory board.71  This decision de-
stroyed the effectiveness of the Court of Claims and gave new life to 
the legislative claims system.72  Claimants who lost in the court ap-
 
 64 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (repealed 1982). 
 65 See COWEN, supra note 33, at 20 (describing the 1855 Act as just the “beginning”); 
Shimomura, supra note 26, at 652 (detailing the framework and powers of the new tribu-
nal). 
 66 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, §§ 1,  3, 10 Stat. 612, 618 (outlining the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the new tribunal). 
 67 See id. §§ 2, 5 (authorizing a solicitor to represent the government and providing parties 
an opportunity to cross-examine). 
 68 Id. §§ 7–9.  The decision to deny the court authority to render final judgment was closely 
contested.  See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 650–52 (discussing the legislative proposals 
and debates that aimed to relieve Congress of the inundation of claims). 
 69 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, §§ 7–9, 10 Stat. 612, 613–14 (establishing procedures for 
the Court of Claims to submit reports and draft bills to Congress); see also Slattery v. Unit-
ed States, 635 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Any payment to the claimant was im-
plemented by specific legislative enactment.”). 
 70 See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 607, 607–10, 970–73, 1241–49 (1856) (debating 
whether Court of Claims judgments should be final or closely reviewed by Congress).  
Congressman Houston stated the issue succinctly: 
If it be intended that we are simply to carry out the judgment of the Court of 
Claims in every case, we might as well pass the bills without referring them any-
where.  If, however, our purpose is to make an examination of the cases our-
selves . . . it ought to take the usual course . . . [and] go, as in other cases, to one of 
the standing committees . . . whose appropriate duty and business it is to make 
that particular examination. 
  Id. at 607. 
 71 Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653; Wiecek, supra note 2, at 397. 
 72 See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398 (describing congressional review of Court of Claims deci-
sions); see also Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653 (explaining the consequences of treating 
Court of Claims decisions as advisory). 
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pealed to Congress; claimants who won had to await an appropria-
tion, and Congress closely examined pro-claimant decisions.73  In-
deed, Court of Claims judgments from 1855 to 1860 totaled $529,000, 
but by 1860 Congress had paid only half that amount.74 
The inequities and delays of the old, legislative system persisted.75  
In 1857, three members of the House were caught up in claims and 
bribery scandals.76  The number of claims increased dramatically with 
the coming of the Civil War.77  In his first inaugural address, Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln recognized that the claims system was bro-
ken.78  With the goal of freeing Congress’s time so that it could deal 
with broader questions, he urged that the Court of Claims be granted 
authority to make final judgments: 
[I]t is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more than usually 
engaged, for some time to come, with great national questions.  It was in-
tended, by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this 
branch of business from the halls of Congress; but while the court has 
proved to be an effective and valuable means of investigation, it in great 
degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to make 
its judgments final.79 
Both houses of Congress promptly considered but did not enact bills 
that would make claims judgments final.80  In 1862, the overwhelming 
number of war claims led them to renew their efforts.81 
President Lincoln’s recommendation that claims be adjudicated 
by the judiciary82 was adopted when Congress passed the Amended 
 
 73 See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398 (“Adverse decisions of the court were usually accepted by 
Congress, but favorable decisions were debated.”). 
 74 Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653. 
 75 See H.R. REP. NO. 513, at 1–3, 7 (1860) (urging that claims be decided by the district 
courts); Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653 (noting that “all the old problems reap-
peared”); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398 (discussing deficiencies of the claims system in the 
1850s). 
 76 Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398. 
 77 See COWEN, supra note 33, at 21 (recognizing the “extraordinarily large number of war 
claims”). 
 78 President Lincoln said that  
 [i]t is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible, 
for the adjustment of claims against the government, especially in view of their in-
creased number by reason of the war.  It is as much the duty of government to ren-
der prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same 
between private individuals.  The investigation and adjudication of claims in their 
nature belong to the judicial department. 
Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398. 
 79 Id. at 398–99. 
 80 Id. at 399; see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 21 (noting in particular that the “Senate was 
closely divided on the finality issue”). 
 81 See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 399 (“Pressures for the establishment of a court mounted as 
the war claims poured in.”). 
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Court of Claims Act of 1863.83  This statute gave the Court of Claims 
authority to enter final judgments, subject to a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court.84  It expanded the court’s jurisdiction over claims 
based on federal laws, regulations, or contracts to also include set-offs 
and counterclaims.85  The statute prohibited members of Congress 
from representing claimants before the court.86  It also addressed the 
source of payments of final judgments, stating that they “be paid out 
of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satis-
faction of private claims.”87  Accordingly, individual judgments could 
be paid without the need for a case-specific appropriation.88  Con-
gress made periodic appropriations to pay those judgments, begin-
ning in 1864.89 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over claims based on fed-
eral laws, regulations, or contracts remained substantially the same 
 
 82 Id. at 398–99. 
 83 Amended Court of Claims Act of 1863, Ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. 
 84 Id. §§ 3, 5, 12 Stat. at 765–66. 
 85 Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 765. 
 86 Id. § 4, 12 Stat. at 766. 
 87 Id. § 7, 12 Stat. at 766. 
 88 See Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1302 (“This provision . . . removed the need for a special congres-
sional appropriation to pay each individual judgment.”  (citing Shimomura, supra note 
26, at 652–53)).  A last-minute amendment briefly undermined the finality of Court of 
Claims judgments by barring the payment of a claim until “after an appropriation there-
for shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury.”  Act of Mar. 8, 1868, ch. 92, § 
14, 12 Stat. 765, 768 .  Section 14 was repealed after the Supreme Court dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction the first appeal of a Court of Claims decision in Gordon v. United States, 69 
U.S. 561 (1864).  No written opinion was issued with the Court’s judgment, an oddity ex-
plained by a lost opinion and the death of a Chief Justice.  See United States v. Jones, 119 
U.S. 477, 478 (1886) (explaining that the delay in publishing Gordon was due, in part, to 
Chief Justice Roger Taney’s passing); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 401–03 (noting that “Taney 
died before the December term” of 1864).  For our purposes, the key fact is that when he 
announced the Gordon judgment on March 10, 1865, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase stat-
ed, “We think that the authority given to the head of an Executive Department by neces-
sary implication in [Section 14] to revise all the decisions of that court requiring payment 
of money, denies to it the judicial power, from the exercise of which alone appeals can be 
taken to this court.”  Jones, 119 U.S. at 478.  A year after the Gordon decision, Congress re-
pealed Section 14.  Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, § 1 , 14 Stat. 9; see also Gordon, 69 U.S. at 
561 (holding that the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction over Court of Claims 
decisions); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 403–04 (noting that, according to Congressman 
Lyman Trumbull, “[t]he sole object of this bill is to remove this obstacle [§ 14] to taking 
appeals to the Supreme Court”). 
 89 See Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 147, 13 Stat. 145, 148 (appropriating $300,000 to create a 
fund for the payment of Court of Claims judgments “rendered” in the next year); see also 
Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1303–04 (“Following the 1863 enactment, Congress made periodic 
general appropriations for payment of the judgments of the Court of Claims.”); 
Shimomura, supra note 26, at 686–87 (“Congress chose to appropriate funds annually on 
a lump sum basis.”). 
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until 1887.90  Congress continued to use the legislative claims system 
to resolve other claims, principally for takings under the Fifth 
Amendment and torts.91  For those claims the problems of the legisla-
tive system persisted—the mass of private claims consumed Con-
gress’s time and attention, meritorious claims were delayed or left 
unresolved, and little was accomplished.92 
In 1887, Congress enacted the Tucker Act, which expanded the 
Court of Claims’s jurisdiction to also include “claims founded upon 
the Constitution . . . or for damages . . . in [non-tort] cases . . . [for] 
which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United 
States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States 
were suable….”93  A key purpose of the act was to remove congres-
sional responsibility for deciding “a large mass of private claims which 
were encumbering our business and preventing our discharging our 
duties….”94  With its expanded jurisdiction, the Court of Claims had 
new responsibility for cases arising from admiralty contracts, tax re-
funds, takings, and pay disputes.95  Judgments adverse to the United 
States were reported to Congress96 which appropriated funds to pay 
them.97  Later statutes reinforced the practice of appropriating for 
specific judgments.98 
 
 90 See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 663 (discussing statutes that fine-tuned the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Claims). 
 91 Id.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that private property shall not “be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 92 H.R. REP. NO. 49-1077, at 4 (1886). 
 93 Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, §1, 24 Stat. 505, 505. 
 94 See 18 CONG. REC. 2678 (1887) (statement of Rep. Tucker). 
 95 See COWEN, supra note 33, at 43–51 (listing and describing these new areas of jurisdic-
tion).  
 96 Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 11, 24 Stat. 505, 507. 
 97 See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 661 (noting that from 1876 to 1894, Congress typically 
appropriated funds to pay specific judgments). 
 98 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 14-6.  A 1904 
statute required all judgments against the United States to be “transmitted to Congress 
through the Treasury Department” in the same fashion as other estimates for appropria-
tion.  Act of Apr. 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-189, 33 Stat. 394, 422.  In 1950, this provision 
was repealed as part of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 
81-784, § 301(3), 64 Stat. 832, 839.  Because the new statute required the president to 
submit a budget to Congress, it did not alter the requirement that Congress appropriate 
funds to pay judgments.  1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra 
note 8, at 14-6. 
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C.  The Federal Tort Claims Act 
One large category of claims remained largely in congressional 
hands for another six decades—tort claims against the government.99  
Using the legislative claims system to decide individual tort claims in-
volved the same problems that arose with contract and taking 
claims.100  The procedures were unfair.101  The legislative branch re-
mained unsuited for deciding individual claims.102  As one congress-
man observed, the legislative claims system “ma[d]e justice for the 
individual a matter of political favor instead of independent right.”103  
The process wasted a great deal of congressional time for very poor 
results.104  Only a small proportion of the claims were successful:  in 
the 68th Congress, 250 of 2,200 private bills became law; in the 76th 
Congress, 315 of 1,763 did.105 
For decades Congress debated various proposals for a broad tort 
claims act.106  Echoing President Lincoln’s call for Congress to rid it-
 
 99 Prior to passing the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, Congress had enacted several stat-
utes to allow tort suits against the government in specific situations, such as admiralty dis-
putes and Post Office negligence.  See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, 
at 25, 38–39, 47–48 (listing statutes). 
100 See  id. at 49–55 (collecting comments dating from 1832 to 1940 by congressmen criticiz-
ing the legislative system for deciding tort claims against the government). 
101 Id.  In 1926, Massachusetts Congressman Charles L. Underhill explained, “The power 
vested in the chairman of the Committee on Claims is tremendous and absolutely wrong.  
I can either refuse arbitrarily to consider your claim or I can take up each and every one 
of your claims to suit my convenience.”  Id. at 52; accord id. at 54 (noting, in a 1940 state-
ment made by Rep. Robinson, the waste of time and inequity caused by the procedures 
for bringing a claim against the government). 
102 See id. at 37 (noting that “the judgment of the past two decades has shown [the legislative 
claims procedures] to be inadequate, burdensome, and unproductive of substantial jus-
tice in many cases”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945) (“[I]t does not afford a 
well-defined continually operating machinery for the consideration of such claims.”). 
103 Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 54 (1940 statement of Rep. Vorys). 
104 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946) (discussing the tediousness of sorting 
through individual claims and the small likelihood of success for such claims); H.R. REP. 
NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945) (describing the criticism of the claims system as “being unduly 
burdensome to the Congress” and “unjust to the claimants”); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and 
H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 49–55 (compiling criticisms by congressmen of the existing 
procedures to obtain relief for private claims). 
105 Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 56; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, 
at 1 (1942) (noting, in a message from President Roosevelt, that less than 20% of private 
claims bills in the 74th, 75th, and 76th Congresses became law); H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 
2 (1945) (listing the proportion of successful private claims bills in various congresses). 
106 See generally Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 40–41 (discussing the 
introduction of various legislative remedies in previous decades); LESTER S. JAYSON & 
ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 2.09–2.10 (2013) (describ-
ing tort recovery options and limitations before and after the enactment of the FTCA). 
   Congress had previously passed a myriad of statutes that provided remedies for torts 
arising in particular circumstances.  See id. § 2.05 (describing twenty-four such statutes).  
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self of private claims so it could deal with “great national questions” 
pertaining to the Civil War,107 when the United States entered World 
War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged passage of a general 
tort claims act so that Congress and the executive branch would not 
be diverted from more important matters that confronted the na-
tion.108  Finally, in 1946 Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”) as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.109 
The FTCA is a general waiver of the United States’ sovereign im-
munity for suits sounding tort.110  It gives federal district courts sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over tort claims arising from negligent or 
wrongful acts of federal employees.111  It is a limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity, subject to jurisdictional limits and affirmative defens-
es,112 but on the whole it succeeds at providing reasonable compensa-
tion for persons injured by run-of-the-mill negligence of federal 
employees.113  Title I of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
prohibited private relief bills for claims that might be brought under 
the FTCA, effectively relieving Congress of its legislative claims sys-
tem.114 
As originally passed, the FTCA provided that its judgments be 
paid under the same procedure as the Tucker Act, by enactment of a 
 
These ranged from statutes of very limited scope, such as protecting oyster growers (Act 
of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1028, 1049) or persons damaged by Lighthouse Service 
vessels (Act of June 17, 1910, ch. 301, 36 Stat. 534, 537), to those of broad application, 
such as the Federal Employees Compensation Act (Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, 39 Stat. 
742) and the Suits in Admiralty Act (Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525). 
107 Wiecek, supra note 2, at 399 (citing MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1902)); see also supra note 78  and accompanying text (recognizing prob-
lems with the claims system in place at the time). 
108 See H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1 (1942) (“In these critical days of our national-defense ef-
fort, I feel there should be a joint endeavor on the part of the Congress and . . . the exec-
utive branch . . . to divest our minds as far as possible of matters of lesser importance 
which consume considerable time and effort.”). 
109 Fed. Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). 
110 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012). 
111 Id. 
112 See, e.g., id. (granting subject matter jurisdiction in limited circumstances); id. § 2675(a) 
(establishing the administrative claims procedure); id. § 2680 (listing exceptions to the 
FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity). 
113 See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 106, § 3.01 (noting that a primary purpose of the 
FTCA was “to do justice to those who had suffered injuries or losses through the wrongs 
of government employees”). 
114 See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 831 (“No 
private bill . . . for personal injuries or death for which suit may be instituted under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act . . . shall be received or considered in either the Senate or the 
House of Representatives.”). 
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specific appropriation.115  A different procedure was used for pay-
ments of settlements.  Initially, the FTCA provided that administrative 
settlements made by agencies and all settlements made by the Attor-
ney General of cases in litigation were to be paid by the head of the 
relevant agency from “appropriations that may be made therefor.”116  
Congress duly appropriated funds to pay such settlements.117  To re-
move the bureaucratic burden of continually enacting appropriations 
bills to pay settlements, Congress amended the FTCA in 1950 to allow 
payment of administrative settlements from “appropriations available 
to such agency.”118 
D.  Creation of the Judgment Fund 
As the number of judgments requiring congressional approval in-
creased in the 1950s, so did the burden on the executive and legisla-
tive branches of going through the routine process of preparing, ex-
plaining, and enacting the necessary legislation.119  The delays in 
awaiting congressional approval of legislation to pay court judgments 
increased interest charges and caused consternation for successful 
plaintiffs.120  To address these problems, in 1953 the General Ac-
counting Office recommended the establishment of a permanent, 
 
115 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 411, 60 Stat. at 844; 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 14-51 to 14-52. 
116 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 403(c), 60 Stat. at  812.  At that time $1,000 was 
the limit of agency authority for administrative settlements under the FTCA.  Id. § 403(a).  
That amount was raised to $2,500 in 1959.  Act of Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-238, 73 
Stat. 471.  Claims in excess of the prescribed amount had to be brought in federal district 
court.  Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 410, 60 Stat. at 812. 
117 See, e.g., Treasury and Post Office Dep’ts Appropriation Act, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-147, ch. 
186, 61 Stat. 216 (1947); Navy Dep’t Appropriation Act, 1948, Pub. L. No. 202, ch. 268, 61 
Stat. 382, 383 (1947); Dep’ts of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriation 
Act, 1948, Pub. L. No. 166, ch. 211, 61 Stat. 279, 289, 294, 302 (1947). 
118 See Act of Sept. 23, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-830, § 9, 64 Stat. 985, 987 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 
81-2984, at 9–10 (1950). 
119 See H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72 (1956) (recognizing the  bill would reduce inter-
est payments); Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 
884–85, 889 (1956) (noting that processing appropriation requests took unnecessary time 
from executive and legislative resources, delayed payments, and increased interest costs); 
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 (elaborat-
ing on the burdensome process of allocating resources to process appropriations). 
120 See H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72 (1956) (recognizing that creation of the Judg-
ment Fund would simplify payments and reduce interest payments); Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 885, 888–89 (1956) (explaining 
that the delay between the award of a final judgment and congressional enactment of an 
appropriation bill to pay it caused annoyance to claimants). 
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indefinite appropriation for the payment of judgments.121  In 1956 
Congress acted on that recommendation by creating the Judgment 
Fund—an open-ended, permanent appropriation for the payment of 
judgments of district courts and the Court of Claims that did not ex-
ceed $100,000.122  Congress expected that ninety-eight percent of 
judgments would fall within that limit.123  Under the new procedure, 
judgments for that amount or less were paid automatically, without 
the need for legislation.124  Use of the Judgment Fund successfully re-
duced the administrative burden, interest charges on judgments 
against the government, and “the irritations inevitably associated with 
the delays occasioned by the former method of payment.”125 
In 1961, in view of the success of the 1956 statute,126 Congress ex-
panded the scope of the Judgment Fund so that it could be used to 
pay settlements of claims in circumstances where it would pay final 
judgments.127  The revised statute stated, “[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided by law, compromise settlements . . . made by the Attorney Gen-
eral [or his designee] . . . shall be settled and paid in a manner simi-
 
121 See H. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72; Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 84th Cong. 883–88 (1956) (discussing the Administration’s “Proposal to Ex-
pedite the Payment of Judgments against the United States”); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 (providing background to the deci-
sion to establish a permanent fund for payment of judgments).  The 1953 proposal was 
rejected because it provided for the Comptroller General to identify for Congress specific 
judgments that should not be paid.  See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 84th Cong. 885, 888 (1956). 
122 Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 84-814, § 1302, 70 Stat. 678, 694–95 
(1956).  The statute provided, inter alia: 
There are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
priated, and out of the postal revenues, respectively, such sums as may hereafter 
be necessary for the payment, not otherwise provide for, as certified by the Comp-
troller General, of judgments (not in excess of $100,000 in any one case) rendered 
by the district courts and the Court of Claims against the United States which have 
become final, together with such interest and costs as may be specified in such 
judgments or otherwise authorized by law. 
  Id. 
123 H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72; Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appro-
priations, 84th Cong. 884–88 (1956). 
124 See S. REP. NO. 87-733, at 2439 (1961) (noting that before 1956, a “large percentage of the 
judgments rendered against the United States were payable only upon enactment of spe-
cific appropriations legislation”); H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 3 (1961) (explaining how this 
method of payment would help the United States with both foreign policy and interest 
charges). 
125 S. REP. NO. 87-733, at 2 (1961). 
126 Id. at 2–4, 9 (describing the benefits received by the United States from the enactment of 
the 1956 statute); H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 2, 4 (1961). 
127 Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, § 2, 75 Stat. 415, 416. 
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lar to judgments in like causes.”128  Accordingly, settlements that did 
not exceed $100,000 could be paid from the Judgment Fund if a 
judgment on that claim would have been paid from the Fund and no 
other source was mandated by law to pay such settlements.129 
The FTCA’s specific directive that settlements under its provisions 
be paid from “appropriations available to such agency,”130 brought 
FTCA settlements within the “otherwise provided by law” exception.131  
In his letter supporting the 1961 legislation, Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy pointedly noted that, “The draft proposal does not disturb 
the procedure presently followed with respect to the payment of 
compromises effected in suits in the U.S. district courts under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, such settlements being payable solely from 
agency appropriations.”132  The fact that FTCA settlements were paid 
from agency appropriations was one reason Department of Justice 
policy called for the solicitation and consideration of agency views on 
proposed settlements.133  Because of the statutory mandate that FTCA 
settlements be paid from agency funds, the Department of Justice set-
tled FTCA cases with out-of-court stipulations instead of consent 
judgments that would have been paid from the Judgment Fund.134 
In 1966, Congress substantially revised FTCA procedures, mandat-
ing the use of the administrative process for all claims regardless of 
amount, altering the FTCA’s rule for attorney’s fees, and revising its 
statutes of limitations.135  The 1966 amendments also directed that the 
Judgment Fund be used to pay all litigative settlements under 
$100,000 and any administrative settlement between $2,500 and 
$100,000.136  Neither the committee reports nor the one witness who 
appeared at the hearing on the proposed changes (the Civil Divi-
 
128 Id.  The statute also broadened coverage to include judgments from state and foreign 
courts.  See id. § 1 (authorizing the United States to pay final judgments of foreign courts, 
provided the Attorney General determines that it is in the interest of the United States to 
do so). 
129  Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 2–3, 5–6 (1961). 
130 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-830, § 9, 64 Stat. 985, 987. 
131 Sidney B. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 
1218, 1218 n.37 (1967). 
132 H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 6 (1961). 
133 John G. Laughlin, The Compromise of Federal Tort Claims Act Litigation, 1965 A.B.A. SEC. INS. 
NEGL. & COMP. L. PROC. 551, 553 (1965). 
134 Jacoby, supra note 131, at 1218 n.37. 
135 Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, §§ 2, 4, 7, 80 Stat. 306, 306–07. 
136 Id. §§ 1(c), 6, 80 Stat. at 306–07. 
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sion’s Assistant Attorney General) addressed why FTCA settlements 
were to be paid from the Judgment Fund.137 
In 1977, Congress further extended the Judgment Fund to cover, 
inter alia, all Court of Claims and FTCA judgments regardless of 
amount, and all FTCA settlements for more than $2,500.138  Congress 
took this action to eliminate what it had come to see as an “extra, un-
necessary legislative step and improve the efficiency with which the 
government makes settlement on its just debts.”139  In 1978, it adopted 
the same, open-ended use of the Judgment Fund for several other 
statutes that had required congressional appropriations for pay-
ments.140 
The Judgment Fund pays settlements and court-ordered judg-
ments,141 but it is available only under very specific circumstances.142  
 
137 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327 (1966) (lacking discussion on the issue); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532 
(1966) (same); Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation:  
Hearing before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 5 (1966); Jacoby, su-
pra note 131, at 1218. 
138 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, ch. 14, 91 Stat. 61, 96–97; S. 
REP. NO. 95-64, at 173, 204-06 .  The statute did require that the Postal Service and specif-
ic non-appropriated fund instrumentalities reimburse the United States for any settle-
ment or judgments paid on their account from the Judgment Fund.  See Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, ch. 14, 91 Stat. at 97 (listing, for example, 
“the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, 
Coast Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration”). 
139 H.R. REP. NO. 95-98, at 184 (1977). 
140 See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-240, § 201, 92 Stat. 107, 116; 
see also S. REP. NO. 95-564, at 76–77 (1977) (identifying the Military Claims Act, the Na-
tional Guard Claims Act, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the Small 
Claims Act, and the Indian Claims Commission).  Congress has seen fit to have some 
damages settlements paid from agency appropriations.  One example is the Attorney 
General’s authority to settle claims for damages caused by law enforcement officers that 
could not be brought under the FTCA.  31 U.S.C. § 3724 (2012).  A 1989 amendment to 
the statute increased the Attorney General’s settlement authority to $50,000 and brought 
coverage to more Justice Department law enforcement agencies.  Act of Dec. 7, 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 101-203, § 1, 103 Stat. 1805, 1805.  The legislative history of that amendment 
recognized that such settlements are paid from agency appropriations.  See H.R. REP. NO. 
101-46, at 6 (1989). 
141 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-34; see also 
United States v. Varner, 400 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1968) (reading the legislative history 
of the Judgment Fund and noting the Fund’s primary purpose was “to provide for the 
prompt payment of judgments and thereby to eliminate or reduce the costs of interest”); 
United States v. Maryland, 349 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (observing that the Judg-
ment Fund’s goal was to allow claimants to “receive prompt payment without awaiting a 
special appropriation”). 
142 Its key provisions provide:   
  (a) Necessary amounts are appropriated to pay final judgments, awards, compromise set-
tlements, and interest and costs specified in the judgments or otherwise authorized by law 
when— 
 
Oct. 2015] THE JUDGMENT FUND 165 
 
It can pay awards or settlements only if they are “final” and not sub-
ject to further appeal.143  The Judgment Fund is available only for 
monetary awards,144 as opposed to injunctive relief that requires the 
expenditure of funds.145  It can only make a payment that “is not oth-
erwise provided for,”146 which is one that cannot be legally paid from 
another appropriation or fund.147  This is so, even if an agency has 
run out of funds, because “there is only one proper source of funds 
in any given case.”148  Payments can only be made for litigative awards 
under statutes designated by Congress.149  A Judgment Fund payment 
must be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury,150 but the certifica-
 
(1) payment is not otherwise provided for; 
(2) payment is certified by the Secretary of the Treasury; and 
(3) the judgment, award, or settlement is payable— 
(A) under section 2414 [“Payment of judgments and compromise settle-
ments” from District Courts and the Court of International Trade], 
2517 [Payment of Judgments from the Court of Federal Claims], 
2672 [FTCA agency approved administrative claims], or 2677 [FTCA Attorney 
General approved settlements] of title 28; 
(B) under section 3723 of this title [the “Small Claims Act,” allowing agency 
settlement of small property claims]; 
(C) under a decision of a board of contract appeals; or 
(D) in excess of an amount payable from the appropriations of an agency for 
a meritorious claim under section 2733 or 2734 of title 10 [Settlement of spe-
cific claims by the military], section 715 of title 32 [same], or section 20113 of 
title 51 [Specified “Powers of the Administration in performance of func-
tions”]. 
   31 U.S.C. § 1304(a). 
143 Id.; see also Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 374 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (de-
fining final judgment as “[a] court’s last action that settles the rights of the parties and 
disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attor-
ney’s fees) and enforcement of the judgment” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 
(7th ed. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-36 (noting that “a judgment against the United 
States is final for payment purposes when the appellate process is completed”). 
144 See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-38 (“Mon-
ey judgments have ‘traditionally taken the form of a lump sum, paid at the conclusion of 
the litigation.’” (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 533 
(1983))). 
145 See id. (explaining that injunctions such as those that direct agencies to implement gov-
ernment programs or repair buildings do not meet the Judgment Fund requirement). 
146 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1). 
147 62 Comp. Gen. 12, 14 (1982); see also 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW, supra note 1, at 14-39 (explaining that payment is “otherwise provided for” when 
“another appropriation or fund is legally available to satisfy the judgment”). 
148 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-40 . 
149 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3); see also 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, 
supra note 1, at 14-32 to 14-34 (addressing the statutes listed in § 1304(a)(3), observing 
that “Congress sometimes includes a provision in other legislation making particular 
items payable from the Judgment Fund,” and noting that the Judgment Fund was intend-
ed to pay matters “under authority of the Justice Department”). 
150 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(2). 
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tion requirement is ministerial in nature, requiring an evaluation of 
whether the restrictions and limits on the Judgment Fund are met, as 
opposed to assessing the merits of a settlement or judgment.151 
The Judgment Fund’s chief purpose is to pay settlements and 
court ordered judgments.152  It is available to pay judgments awarded 
by U.S. district courts,153 the Court of International Trade,154 and the 
Court of Federal Claims,155 administrative claims,156 and settlements.157  
It is the correct source of payment for most FTCA judgments and set-
tlements for more than $2,500.158  It is the initial source for payment 
of monetary awards by boards of contract appeals.159  Normally agen-
cies are not required to reimburse the Judgment Fund for non-
contract claims and judgments,160 except in limited instances includ-
ing non-appropriated fund instrumentalities,161 judgments against the 
 
151 See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-33 
(“[C]ertification under section 1304 does not involve reviewing the merits of the awards 
submitted for payment.”). 
152 Id. at 14-34; see also Varner, 400 F.2d at 372 (reading the legislative history of the Judgment 
Fund and noting the fund’s primary purpose was “to provide for the prompt payment of 
judgments and thereby to eliminate or reduce the costs of interest”); Maryland, 349 F.2d 
at 695 (observing that the Judgment Fund’s goal was to allow claimants to “receive 
prompt payment without awaiting a special appropriation”). 
153 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (Supp. IV 2011));  see, e.g., 
Lozada v. United States, 974 F.2d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1992). 
154 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (Supp. IV 2011));  see, e.g., Luci-
ano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori Instrumenti Musicali v. United States, 11 C.I.T. 280, 282 
(1987), aff’d, 837 F.2d 465 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
155 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2517 (2012));  see, e.g., Cardiosom, 
L.L.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1302. 
156 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2012)). 
157 Id. 
158 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-48. 
159 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(C) (2012); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW, supra note 1, at 14-48; 41 U.S.C. § 7108(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2011); Bureau of Land 
Mgmt.–Reimbursement of Contract Disputes Act Payments, April 24, 1984, 63 Comp. 
Gen. 308 (1984);  see, e.g., The Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 54853, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33270, 2009 
WL 4738163 (Apr. 12, 2006); Montage, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, GSBCA No. 16758-ST, 
2006 WL 2978322 (Oct. 12, 2006); Appeals of the Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, IBCA 
No. 4711, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33253, 2006 WL 6435815 (Apr. 14, 2006); SecTek, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., DOTCAB No. 4516, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33067, 2005 WL 3789969 (Sept. 8, 
2005). 
160 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-32, 14-32 
n.62. 
161 See id. at 15-266 (noting that non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (“NAFIs”) generally 
must pay judgments from their own funds); see also United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 
123, 127 (1976) (suggesting that unless it specifically acts, Congress does not intend to as-
sume NAFIs’ obligations); Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc., 937 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting that NAFIs may be subject to claims against them and their non-appropriated as-
sets). 
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U.S. Postal Service,162 discrimination or retaliation claims filed by fed-
eral employees,163 and awards to contractors under contract dispute 
procedures.164 
E.  Normalizing Use of the Judgment Fund 
Federal agencies have sought through procedural devices to have 
the Judgment Fund pay expenses that would otherwise come from 
appropriated funds.  In some circumstances, Congress has addressed 
this problem by requiring agencies to reimburse the Judgment Fund.  
Efforts to contain such raids on the Judgment Fund have had mixed 
results. 
1.  The Contracts Disputes Act 
In 1978, Congress passed the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”)165 to 
rationalize the “administrative and judicial procedures for the settle-
ment of claims and disputes relating to Government contracts.”166  
Among other changes, the CDA modified the method by which judi-
cial judgments and awards from boards of contract appeals are paid.  
Prior to the CDA, judicial judgments were paid from the Judgment 
Fund and board of contract appeal awards were paid from agency 
funds.167  The CDA provided that (1) both court judgments and mon-
etary awards from boards of contract appeals would be paid from the 
Judgment Fund,168 and (2) agencies would reimburse the Judgment 
 
162 See 39 U.S.C. § 409(h) (2012) (requiring the Postal Service to pay judgments against it 
from its own funds). 
163 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No FEAR) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-174, § 201(b), 116 Stat. 566, 568–69 (2002). 
164 41 U.S.C. § 7108(c) (Supp. IV 2011).  The Judgment Fund statute addresses two other 
issues that are only tangentially relevant to the topic under discussion.  They are the pay-
ment of interest, 31 U.S.C. § 1304(b), and the payment of judgments and settlements 
arising from contracts of military exchanges.  31 U.S.C. § 1304(c). 
165 Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) [hereinafter 
“CDA”] (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2006)). 
166 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 5 (1978); see generally Clarence Kipps, Tom Kindness & Camer-
on Hamrick, The Contract Disputes Act:  Solid Foundations, Magnificent System, 28 PUB. CONT. 
L. J. 585, 585–87 (1999) (comparing CDA with the prior system for resolving federal con-
tract disputes). 
167 Major Key, Reimbursement of the Judgment Fund Under the Contract Disputes Act, 2000 ARMY 
LAW. 32, 33 (2000) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 33 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5267); see also 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW, supra note 8, at 14-11. 
168 CDA, Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 13, 92 Stat. 2383, 2389 (1978).  An exception was made for 
judgments and awards against the Tennessee Valley Authority.  Id. § 13(d), 92 Stat. at 
2389. 
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Fund for those payments from “available funds or by obtaining addi-
tional appropriations for such purposes.”169  Congress included the 
reimbursement requirement in the CDA to make agencies more ac-
countable and to facilitate compromise.170  Before the CDA, agencies 
had an incentive to prolong litigation and force a final judgment in 
court because those judgments were paid from the Judgment Fund 
rather than from agency funds.171  This practice hid the true costs of 
programs by allowing agencies to avoid either paying all program 
costs from appropriated funds or having to seek new appropriations 
from Congress.172  The new procedure also expedited payments when 
agencies ran out of appropriated funds and reduced government in-
terest costs.173 
The system did not work as planned because agencies frequently 
failed to reimburse the Judgment Fund for CDA payments made 
from it on their behalf.  For fiscal years 2001–2003, less than twenty 
percent of CDA money paid from the Judgment Fund was reim-
bursed.174  On average it took 9.6 months to complete payment on 
those cases for which the Judgment Fund was fully reimbursed.175  
The repayment rate improved to 45.9% in 2004, 27.8% in 2005, and 
27.4% in 2006.176  Although the CDA does not specify when agencies 
must reimburse the Judgment Fund, Treasury regulations suggest re-
payment should be made “promptly upon notification . . . of the 
 
169 Id. § 13(c), 92 Stat. at 2389. 
170 See S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 33 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5267 (suggest-
ing that reimbursement ensures that agencies pay the actual total costs of programs); 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 31–32 (1978).  See generally Key, supra note 167, at 33 (tracing 
the history of agencies’ payment responsibilities under the CDA). 
171 S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 33, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267 (observing the perverse 
incentive not to settle claims). 
172 Id.; accord H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 86 (1978); see also Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comp-
troller Gen. of the United States, to Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Chairman, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary (Aug. 17, 1977) (noting that the CDA’s reimbursement provision would elimi-
nate “the existing incentive” agencies had to avoid settlements, and would provide greater 
transparency of the actual “economic cost of procurement programs”). 
173 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 31–32; see also Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 664, 668 
(2010) (suggesting that the purpose of the new procedure was to save on the cost of in-
terest to the government (citing Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994))). 
174 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-481, JUDGMENT FUND:  TREASURY’S 
ESTIMATES OF CLAIM PAYMENT PROCESSING COSTS UNDER THE NO FEAR ACT AND 
CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT 4 (2004) [hereinafter GAO-04-481]. 
175 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-295R, THE JUDGMENT FUND:  STATUS OR 
REIMBURSEMENTS REQUIRED BY THE NO FEAR ACT AND CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT 8 (2008) 
[hereinafter GAO-08-295R]. 
176 Id. at 9. 
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amount due”;177 Treasury lacks authority to compel payment.178  
Agencies told Treasury that they deferred making the required pay-
ments because doing so would have adversely affected their programs 
and key activities.179  In 2007, Treasury’s Financial Management Ser-
vice initiated actions to improve agency responsiveness, including the 
posting on its website of outstanding balances owed to the Judgment 
Fund.180 
2.  The No FEAR Act 
The 2002 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination 
and Retaliation Act (“No FEAR Act”)181 addressed the problem of 
chronic discrimination and retaliation in the federal workplace.182  It 
did so by requiring greater notification to federal employees of their 
rights,183 in-depth reporting about cases of agency discrimination,184 
and, similar to the CDA’s payment scheme, agency reimbursement of 
the Judgment Fund for payments made from it for “judgments, 
awards, and compromise settlements” arising from discriminatory 
conduct directed at federal employees or applicants.185 
Requiring agency reimbursement addressed the fact that although 
discrimination claims were increasing,186 agencies had little financial 
motivation to change bad practices because adverse judgments had 
 
177 31 C.F.R. § 256.41 (2013). 
178 See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 9. 
179 See GAO-04-481, supra note 174, at 4. 
180 See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 10–11 (listing actions such as using billing letters, 
phone calls and emails, and increasing agency awareness); see also 5 C.F.R. § 724.101 et 
seq. (2005) (establishing similar provisions for the No FEAR Act). 
181 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107–174, 116 Stat. 566 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (2012)). 
182 H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, 2001 WL 670677, 7–9 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419, 
419–22; S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 6–7 (2002). The Act grew out of an investigation by the 
House Science Committee into discrimination at the Environmental Protection Agency.  
S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 2 (2002); see generally Intolerance at EPA—Harming People, Harming 
Science?:  Hearing before the H. Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong. 91–92 (2000) (discussing the 
EPA’s history of discrimination and retaliation issues); Lindsey Nelson, Mission Not Accom-
plished:  Missing Billions in Iraq, Enhanced Whistleblower Protections, and A Large Failure in A 
Small Step, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277, 291 (2008) (noting three causes of the EPA’s problems 
that led to enactment of the No FEAR Act). 
183 Pub. L. No. 107–174, § 202, 116 Stat. at 569. 
184 Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 569. 
185 Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 568. 
186 See Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2001:  Hearing on 
H.R. 169 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of Kweisi 
Mfume, President and CEO, NAACP) (decrying the increase in discrimination claims 
within the federal government and suggesting that bringing a formal claim is “often tan-
tamount to a death sentence for a person’s career within the federal government”). 
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no effect on their bottom line.187  Prior to enactment of the No FEAR 
Act, payment of damages arising from federal employment discrimi-
nation claims was handled in a two-tier system:  claims that were re-
solved on the administrative level were paid from agency funds, while 
claims resolved in the courts were paid from the Judgment Fund.188  
This circumstance provided a “perverse incentive” for agencies to re-
sist settlement of discrimination claims at the administrative level.189  
As the Senate Report explained, use of the Judgment Fund “discour-
ages accountability by being a disincentive to agencies to resolve mat-
ters promptly in the administrative processes; by not pursuing resolu-
tion, an agency could shift the cost of resolution from its budget to 
the Judgment Fund and escape the scrutiny that would accompany a 
request for a supplemental appropriation.”190  The No FEAR Act re-
moved that disincentive by requiring federal agencies to reimburse 
the Judgment Fund for payments made on discrimination and retali-
ation claims.191 
Reimbursement rates were much higher for No FEAR payments 
than for CDA payments,192 although the No FEAR Act similarly did 
not set a deadline for reimbursements.193  For fiscal years 2004–2006 
 
187 See S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3 (observing that, in fiscal year 2000, agencies were relieved of 
paying almost $43 million in discrimination claims because of the Judgment Fund); 147 
CONG. REC. 778 (Jan. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. John Warner) (“I firmly believe that 
because there is no financial consequence to their actions, Federal agencies are essential-
ly able to escape responsibility when they fail to comply with the law and are unresponsive 
to their employees’ concerns.”). 
188 H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, at 13, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419, 425-26; S. REP. NO. 107-
143, at 7. 
189 The Committee on the Judiciary used the term “perverse incentive” in the House Report: 
The Committee finds that allowing Federal agencies to use the general treasury as 
a slush fund to pay court judgments and settlements for discriminating and retali-
ating, has created: 
(1) a lack of accountability among some of the Federal agencies; and 
(2) a perverse incentive for agencies to prolong the cases until they reach court. 
  H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, at 13, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 426.  See also id. at 52, 54 
(illustrating, in the statement of Rep. Nadler, the use of the term “perverse incentive”). 
190 S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3 (quoting J. Christopher Mihm, General Accounting Office, Tes-
timony Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, May 9, 2001, p. 
8). 
191 Pub. L. No. 107–174, § 201, 116 Stat. at 568; see also S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3 (observing 
that agencies will still use the Judgment Fund to initially pay the discrimination claims to 
prevent large settlements or judgments from disrupting agency operations in the short 
term); H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, pt. 1, at 13, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419, 427 (observ-
ing that smaller agencies can spread Judgment Fund reimbursement payments over sev-
eral years, as the No FEAR Act only requires payment within a reasonable amount of 
time). 
192 GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 8. 
193 See, e.g., VIVIAN S. CHU & BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE 
JUDGMENT FUND:  HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND COMMON USAGE 15 (2013) [hereinafter 
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nearly all No FEAR payments were reimbursed, with the average time 
of repayment dropping to 2.9 months in 2006.194  A key reason for 
this higher reimbursement rate is the smaller relative size of No 
FEAR payments compared to agency budgets.195 
3.  The Equal Access to Justice Act 
Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in 1980 
to help smaller entities protect their rights and seek review of gov-
ernment conduct without being deterred by litigation expenses.196  
The statute used the carrot of reimbursing attorneys fees to entities 
that succeeded against the government197 and the stick of subtracting 
those fees from appropriated funds of agencies that acted in bad faith 
or took positions that were not substantially justified.198  EAJA created 
three fee-shifting mechanisms to allow eligible parties to recover costs 
and attorneys fees incurred in agency adjudications and civil litiga-
tion against a federal agency or the United States.199  The first, appli-
cable to judicial cases and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), makes the 
United States liable for attorney fees “to the same extent that any 
other party would be liable under the common law or under the 
terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award” un-
less another statute prohibits such an award.200  Accordingly, the 
United States is liable for attorney fees under federal fee-shifting stat-
utes and exceptions to the “American Rule” on attorneys’ fees.201  The 
statute provides that fees awarded under § 2412(b) are to be paid 
from the Judgment Fund unless the agency is “found to have acted in 
 
CRS JUDGMENT FUND], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42835.pdf (noting statute 
provides no “definitive period”). 
194 See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 5 (noting that of $45.1 million through fiscal year 
2006, $44.9 million had been reimbursed by April 2007). 
195 See id. at 8, 13.  For fiscal years 2002–2006 the average CDA payment was $2.1 million; the 
average No FEAR payment (2004–2006) was $72,064.  Id. at 5–6. 
196 Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96–481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified as amend-
ed at 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. § 2412);  see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
12-417R, LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON USDA AND INTERIOR ATTORNEY FEE CLAIMS AND 
PAYMENTS 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO 12-417R] (“The premise of EAJA was to help en-
sure that decisions to contest administrative actions are based on the merits and not the 
cost of litigation . . . .”); Louise L. Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 229, 230 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of the EAJA is to al-
low certain parties to challenge unreasonable federal government action.”). 
197 See S. REP. NO. 96-253, at 5–6 (1980) (recognizing the civic value of showing government 
policies are erroneous or inaccurate); H.R.  REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980) (same). 
198 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 17  (noting punitive aspect of reducing agency budgets). 
199 Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. at 2325, 2327; GAO-12-417R, supra note 196, at 7. 
200 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2012). 
201 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-68, 14-69. 
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bad faith,” in which case they are to be paid from the agency’s 
funds.202 
EAJA’s other two fee-shifting mechanisms are similar to each oth-
er.  The second litigation fee mandate, codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d), applies when the United States loses in certain judicial 
proceedings “unless the court finds [its] position . . . was substantially 
justified….”203  The administrative adjudications mandate, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 504, awards fees when a losing agency’s position is not found by the 
adjudicative officer to be “substantially justified.”204  The 1980 statute 
provided that fees and expenses under both provisions “may be paid 
by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made 
available to the agency, by appropriation or otherwise, for such pur-
pose.  If not paid by any agency, the fees and other expenses shall be 
paid [from the Judgment Fund].”205 
Agencies have aggressively sought to have the Judgment Fund pay 
EAJA fees.206  In 1982 the Department of Transportation argued that 
the use of “may” in these provisions meant that agencies had discre-
tion to pay an EAJA award from agency funds, or not; if the agency 
did not choose to pay the bill the Judgment Fund would.207  The De-
partment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) rejected this po-
sition as inconsistent with EAJA’s legislative history and concluded 
that at least some fees must be paid from agency appropriations.208  In 
1985, Congress amended EAJA and eliminated any agency discretion 
by rescinding the “may be paid” language and directing that “Fees 
and other expenses awarded under this subsection shall be paid by 
any agency . . . from any funds made available to the agency by ap-
propriation or otherwise.”209  It did so intending that the award of fees 
 
202 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2). 
203 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (“Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court 
shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in 
addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any 
civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).”). 
204 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). 
205 Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. at 2327, 2329 (emphasis added). 
206 See, e.g., CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 12 (“Since the passage of EAJA, agencies 
have disputed whether payments under the act must be made out of their appropriations 
or whether attorneys’ fees may be charged to the Judgment Fund.”). 
207 6 Op. O.L.C. 204, 210–11 (1982). 
208 Id. at 210–12. 
209 Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 1(e), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 
504(d)); see also id. at 185 (using nearly identical language to amend 28 U.S.C. § 
2412(d)(4)). 
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from agency funds provide agencies a strong disincentive against tak-
ing unreasonable positions.210 
A similar EAJA payment issue arose in the aftermath of the Feder-
al Circuit’s decision in Cienega Gardens v. United States,211 which found 
for plaintiffs in a suit regarding amendments to a Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) program.212  Even though 
EAJA squarely provided for payment of this award from agency ap-
propriations,213 HUD urged that payment should come from the 
Judgment Fund because the plaintiffs had sued the United States and 
not the agency.214  The Treasury Department argued that because the 
party won in an action over an agency, HUD was responsible for the 
payment.215  Resolving the dispute, the OLC determined that HUD 
had to pay.216  OLC clarified that “HUD constitutes the agency over 
which the party prevailed” as determined by EAJA.217  Further, OLC 
concluded that “[t]he Judgment Fund is available to pay a 
[§ 2412(d)(4)] fee award only if there is no agency over which the 
plaintiffs can be said to have prevailed under EAJA.”218 
The legislative goal to have the threat of awarding fees from agen-
cy funds serve as a deterrent to unreasonable agency positions219 and 
the change of statutory language from agencies “may”220 pay to 
“shall”221 pay fees and expenses granted by EAJA, suggest that Con-
gress intended for many EAJA payments to come from agency appro-
priations.222  This is not necessarily what happens.  There is tension 
 
210 See 131 Cong. Rec. S9991-02 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley) 
(noting that EAJA’s positive effect on agency action will improve “with the passage of this 
bill, which provides for the fees payment out of the offending agency’s budget”); H.R. 
REPT. 99-120, at 8 (1985) (noting the increase in liability for administrative agencies due 
to EAJA); H.R. REP. 98-992, at 9 (1984) (clarifying the “substantially justified” standard as 
including positions taken prior to litigation); S. REP. 98-586, at 19 (1984) (discussing the 
requirement that fee awards must come from “the offending agency’s budget”). 
211 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
212 Id. at 1324. 
213 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4); 31 Op. O.L.C. 229, 233 (2007). 
214 31 Op. O.L.C. at 233–34. 
215 Id. at 234. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 242 (stating the same). 
218 Id. at 236. 
219 131 CONG. REC. S9991-02 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
220 Pub. L. No. 96–481, 94 Stat. 2325, 2327, 2329 (1980). 
221 Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183, 184–85; 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-70. 
222 See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 13 (“The opinion did not leave open the pos-
sibility that agencies could be reimbursed for awards made pursuant to EAJA from the 
Judgment Fund and strongly suggested they would have to use their own appropria-
tions.”). 
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between § 2412(b)’s directive that attorneys’ fees be paid from the 
Judgment Fund if a fee-shifting statute or common law attorneys fee 
rule applies (absent agency “bad faith”),223 and the requirement of 
§ 2412(d) and § 504 that they be paid from agency appropriations if 
the agency lost (unless its position was “substantially justified”).224  
While the line between these alternatives may be clear in the abstract, 
in practice it may be hard to see, particularly when the people nego-
tiating the payment are the attorney who will receive the fee and the 
government attorney who handled the litigation. 
Discussion about the scope and nature of EAJA payments is par-
ticularly heated in environmental matters involving the EPA, the De-
partment of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture.  Critics 
suggest that environmental organizations use a “sue and settle” strat-
egy to bypass the normal administrative process when they sue an 
agency, the agency settles, and the resulting consent decree effective-
ly becomes a binding regulation.225  Use of EAJA is seen as part of that 
strategy and as an incentive for environmental organizations to bring 
suit.226  Some have questioned whether agencies actively invite such 
litigation.227  One side in this debate has called for wholesale reform 
 
223 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (c)(2) (2012). 
224 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(4); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(1), (d)(3), 
(d)(4). 
225 See Henry N. Butler & Nathaniel J. Harris, Sue, Settle, and Shut Out the States:  Destroying the 
Environmental Benefits of Cooperative Federalism, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 582–86 
(2014) (describing the “sue and settle” process and summarizing the problems it causes); 
Temple Stoellinger, Seeing Through the Regional Haze, 37 WYO. LAW. 34, 37 (2014) (ex-
plaining that “where environmental groups sue the EPA, the EPA then agrees to settle the 
lawsuits through a binding decree which dictates rules for EPA’s action, thereby eliminat-
ing that state’s ability to engage in negotiations with EPA”).  House Agriculture Commit-
tee Ranking Member Collin C. Peterson explained this viewpoint in an Op-Ed piece: 
[T]here seems to be a pattern of an activist lawsuit, followed by an EPA settlement, 
resulting in new EPA regulations to comply with the settlement . . . resulting in 
policy decisions being made by activists, bureaucrats and lawyers . . . . This so-
called “sue and settle” strategy keeps the process in the dark. 
  Collin C. Peterson, Peterson Op-Ed:  Time to Clean Up the EPA, 112 H. PRESS RELEASE (Mar. 
18, 2011), http://democrats.agriculture.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1101 . 
226 See Lowell E. Baier, Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act, 38 J. LEGIS. 1, 49–50 (2012) 
(noting that in the twelve months beginning on September 1, 2009, “twenty frequent en-
vironmental litigants” received at least $5.8 million in EAJA payments); see also Michael J. 
Mortimer & Robert W. Malmsheimer, The Equal Access to Justice Act and US Forest Service 
Land Management:  Incentives to Litigate?, 109 J. FORESTRY 352, 353–54 (2011) (cataloging 
studies of EAJA payments in environmental cases). 
227 Regulatory Chaos:  Finding Legislative Solutions to Benefit Jobs and the Economy:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Environment and the Economy of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th 
Cong. 77 (2011) (statement of Rep. Whitfield) (“[W]e have reason to believe from dis-
cussions with a lot of different groups that EPA is actually out there encouraging these 
lawsuits . . . .”); see also id. at 69 (question by Rep. Shimkus). 
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of EAJA to account for this “strategy”;228 the other argues for preserva-
tion of the statute and its use in environmental litigation.229 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CLAIMS PAYMENTS 
A.  The Statements and Accounts Clause 
In the debate on the Statements and Accounts Clause at the Con-
stitutional Convention, George Mason proposed that reports of ex-
penditures should be required annually; James Madison argued that 
the legislature should be given discretion to choose when to make 
such disclosures.230  The Articles of Confederation had required semi-
annual reports.231  Ultimately Madison’s view prevailed, resulting in 
the Clause’s “from time to time”232 language and leaving Congress 
with great latitude as to when to publish expenditures.233  Both sides 
in the debate agreed that the public had a right to know how the 
government spent its money.234 
Congress has very broad authority over public disclosure of ex-
penditures.235  Only a handful of cases have been brought under the 
Statement and Accounts Clause seeking disclosure of government 
spending; none have succeeded.  The most prominent treatment of 
the issue was the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Richard-
 
228 See, e.g., Baier, supra note 226, at 69–70 (explaining possible methods of reform). 
229 See, e.g., Brian Korpics et al., Shifting the Debate:  In Defense of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 43 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10985, 10998 (2013) (concluding there is “no clear economic or policy ba-
sis that would support a rewrite of EAJA”). 
230 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 618–19; Note, 
Secret Funding, supra note 13, at 609–11 (noting Madison’s concerns that annual reports 
would prove to be functionally useless and impractical). 
231 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (“The United States in Congress 
assembled shall have authority . . . to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the 
United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective States an account of the sums 
of money so borrowed or emitted . . . .”). 
232 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
233 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 619; see also 
Note, Secret Funding, supra note 13, at 609–11 (observing that even though Madison’s view 
prevailed, concerns that the language would produce reports that were extremely infre-
quent surfaced at the New York state ratifying convention). 
234 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 619 (arguing 
the debate really focused on how to best get the information to the people rather than on 
whether the people should have the information); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 149–50 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (stating that “the People 
who give their Money ought to know in what manner it is expended”). 
235 See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the Statement and 
Accounts Clause “is not self-defining and Congress has plenary power to give meaning to 
the provision”). 
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son,236 a challenge to the practice of making secret appropriations to 
the CIA.237  In Richardson, the Court found the petitioner lacked 
standing because his grievance was shared by all members of the pub-
lic.238  Even though the Court did not reach the merits of the case, it 
commented that, “Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting 
and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest.”239  
The Court noted that for almost 200 years the Statement and Ac-
counts Clause had been read to give “Congress plenary power to spell 
out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive 
agencies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds….”240  
Richardson’s sweeping language virtually precludes any future disclo-
sure claims under the Statement and Accounts Clause.241  Although 
the meaning of the clause’s “from time to time” phrase is imprecise, 
courts have consistently interpreted it as giving Congress complete 
discretion over what information to provide about appropriations 
and when to provide it.242 
B.  Statutory Disclosure of Payments 
The history of congressional requirements for public reporting of 
government claims payments reflects a gradual series of changes that 
eventually led to less and less reporting.  Today, no one can know all 
the claims the government pays in any year.243 
 
236 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
237 See id. at 169–70 (noting that the lower court’s decision focused on standing). 
238 Id. at 178. 
239 See id. at 178 n.11 (suggesting the Court need not decide the precise contours of the 
clause’s requirement of a regular statement or account). 
240 Id. 
241 See, e.g., Halperin, 629 F.2d at 152 (citing Richardson and dismissing a constitutional chal-
lenge under art. I, § 9, cl. 7); Harrington, 553 F.2d at 194 n.7  (same). 
242 See, e.g., Harrington, 553 F.2d at 195 (“Since Congressional power is plenary with respect to 
the definition of the appropriations process and reporting requirements, the legislature 
is free to establish exceptions to this general framework . . . .”); Hart’s Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 
459, 484 (1880) (“The absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress, 
and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the people.”). 
243 See 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 14-10 (de-
scribing the multitude of claims that can be brought).  There are many different statutes 
authorizing claims against the government.  See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 7 
(noting that “nearly 100 statutes . . . impact payment from the Judgment Fund”); 2008 
GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-21 to 14-23 (listing 
a “brief sampler” of authorities authorizing administrative settlement of claims); JAYSON & 
LONGSTRETH, supra note 106, § 2.05 (listing twenty-four statues authorizing tort remedies 
and observing that “[t]here simply was no uniformity, or consistency in, or any relation-
ship between, most of these enactments”). 
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In the early Republic, Congress kept close tabs on the payment of 
claims.  For example, the statute regarding Revolutionary War pen-
sions that gave rise to Hayburn’s Case244 called for detailed reports to 
Congress about wounds and disabilities.245  The statute for property 
claims arising from the War of 1812 required that “all adjudica-
tions . . . shall be entered . . . in a book….”246  Of course, when Con-
gress passed a private law granting a remedy, the bill stated the claim-
ant’s name, the amount of the payment or means of assessing it, and 
typically the nature of the claim.247  The same information appears in 
recent private relief bills.248 
When Congress established the Court of Claims in 1855, it initially 
required that in each case the court forward to it a report and draft 
bill for enactment.249  When it passed the Amended Court of Claims 
Act of 1863, it included a requirement that annual reports state the 
names of successful claimants and the amounts received.250  The 
Tucker Act had a similar requirement for reports to Congress,251 and 
Congress frequently appropriated funds to pay specific claims.252 
The FTCA, as originally enacted, called for heads of agencies to 
annually report to Congress on all claims the agency paid under its 
administrative claims authority, stating “the amount claimed and the 
 
244 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
245 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 243, 244. 
246 Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 14, 3 Stat. 261, 264. 
247 See, e.g., An Act For the relief of Vern M. Stanchfield, ch. 100, 58 Stat. 960 (1944) (award-
ing $75 for loss of horse that was injured while being used by a Dept. of the Interior em-
ployee); An act for the relief of John L. T. Jones, of Montgomery County, Maryland, for 
rent and damage sustained by the destruction of a dwelling house by accidental fire while 
the same was being occupied by United States troops for quarters [in 1862], ch. 437, 18 
Stat. 76 (1874) (awarding $4,000); An Act to increase the pension of William Munday, ch. 
48, 6 Stat. 161 (1815) (awarding twenty dollar per month pension to a serviceman “who 
lost both his arms in an attack on the enemy, at St. Leonard’s creek”). 
248 See, e.g., An Act For the relief of retired Sergeant First Class James D. Benoit and Wan 
Sook, Benoit, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002) (awarding $415,000 to compensate for death and 
wrongful retention of remains of David Benoit “resulting from a fall . . . from an upper 
level window while occupying military family housing supplied by the Army in Seoul, Ko-
rea”). 
249 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122-23, § 7, 10 Stat. 612, 613–14 (requiring monthly, printed 
reports). 
250 See Act of 1863, Ch. 92, § 7, 12 Stat. 765, 766 (requiring report “of all sums paid at the 
treasury on such judgments, together with the names of the parties in whose favor the 
same were allowed”). 
251 See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 11, 24 Stat. 505, 507 (requiring the Attorney General to 
report each final judgment of the Court of Claims). 
252 See, e.g., Shimomura, supra note 26, at 661 (discussing appropriations for claims payments 
in the 1870s). 
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amount awarded, and a brief description of the claim.”253  In 1965 
Congress repealed this reporting requirement.254  It did so as part of 
an effort to reduce needless reports and publications,255 reasoning 
that information about claims settled for $2,500 or less was of “no 
value to preparing agencies and no known use to Congress.”256 
The No FEAR Act mandated that each agency file an annual re-
port identifying, inter alia, the number of cases alleging discrimina-
tion, the status of each, and the amount of money paid on each claim 
and in the aggregate.257  It also required that each agency post on its 
public website detailed statistical information about the status of dis-
crimination complaints filed with the agency (but not including 
money paid), and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion post a summary of this statistical data on its website.258 
When it enacted the EAJA in 1980, Congress required an annual 
report on the fees and expenses awarded under the act, identifying 
“the number, nature, and amount of the awards[,]” and other rele-
vant information.259  The report was expected to allow Congress to 
evaluate EAJA’s cost and identify agencies engaged in unreasonable 
activity.260  This report requirement was repealed as part of the Feder-
al Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995,261 legislation enacted 
to eliminate “unnecessary paperwork” and save staff time.262 
 
253 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 404, 60 Stat. 812, 843 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2673 (2006)). 
254 See Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-348, § 1, 79 Stat. 1310, 1310 (repealing “The annu-
al report to Congress of the administrative adjustment of tort claims of $2,500 or less”). 
255 S. REP. NO. 89-545, at 2 (1965); see also H. REP. NO. 89-1169, at 3–5 (1965) (discussing the 
potential savings from reducing reporting requirements). 
256 S. REP. NO. 89-545, at 3 (1965).  In 1966, Congress amended the FTCA to provide that 
agency appropriations be used for FTCA settlements less than $2,500, the Judgment Fund 
pay settlements between $2,500 and $100,000, and agencies could enter settlements of 
administrative claims up to $25,000 without approval of the Attorney General.  Act of July 
18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 1 (a), (c), 80 Stat. 306.  The statute did not address the 
reporting requirement.  Id. 
257 Pub. L. No. 107-174, § 203(a), 116 Stat. 566, 569. 
258 Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 573; id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 575. 
259 See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203(a)(1), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325–27 
(1980) (amending new 5 U.S.C. § 504(e) to cover administrative proceedings expenses); 
id. § 204(a), 94 Stat. at 2327–29 (adding new 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(5) regarding litigative 
proceedings expenses). 
260 See  S. REP. NO. 96-253, at 18, 21–22 (1965).  Initially assigned to the Chairman of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, the reporting duty for § 2412(d)(5) was 
transferred to the Attorney General by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992.  
Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 502(b), 106 Stat. 4506, 4512. 
261 Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 1091(b), 109 Stat. 707, 722. 
262 See S. REP. NO. 103-375, at 2 (1993) (discussing reasons to require fewer reports). 
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III.  ASSESSING JUDGMENT FUND PRACTICES 
A.  Raids on the Judgment Fund 
1.  Legislative Branch Encroachment 
From the defendants’ side of the ledger, the Judgment Fund—this 
permanent, indefinite appropriation—is a tempting target to agen-
cies and entities seeking protection because it exists outside the nor-
mal appropriation process.  For claims arising under statutes that do 
not require reimbursement the Judgment Fund provides “free mon-
ey” to agencies whose actions gave rise to the claims.  For example, if 
an agency program causes substantial claims under the FTCA, those 
claims will be paid without any reduction in the agency’s programs or 
requirement that the agency justify the cost of the claims to an ap-
propriations committee.263  Congress has authority to alter these 
rules, as it did when it mandated that the newly created Postal Service 
reimburse the Judgment Fund for payments made arising from its ac-
tivities.264 
Entities outside the federal government have sought legislation 
treating them as part of the government for FTCA purposes.  When 
granted, this status makes the Judgment Fund responsible for their 
torts, absolves them of any financial responsibility, and renders the 
FTCA’s defenses applicable to claims against them.265  Congress has 
provided this coverage to manufacturers and distributors of the vac-
cine in the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976,266 cer-
 
263 See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-29 to 14-44 
(discussing requirements that must be met to have payment made from the Judgment 
Fund). 
264 39 U.S.C. § 409(h); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, 
at 14-41. 
   Non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (NAFIs) also generally pay their own judg-
ments and settlements.  2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra 
note 1,  at 14-42 to 14-43; see also Hopkins, 427 U.S. at 127 (suggesting that unless it specif-
ically acts, Congress does not intend to assume NAFIs’ obligations); Mignogna, 937 F.2d at 
42 (noting that NAFIs may be subject to claims against them and their non-appropriated 
assets). 
265 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
FTCA “provide[d] the basis for the cause of action” against a community health center); 
In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting 
that the FTCA sometimes applies to nuclear weapons contractors). 
266 Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k), subsequently 
repealed, Health Services and Centers Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626 § 202, 92 
Stat. 3574); see also U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, 4-10.110 Payment of Judgments by the De-
partment of the Treasury and Postal Service, 1997 WL 1944302 (noting special proce-
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tain tribal contractors,267 and nuclear weapons contractors.268  Because 
the Judgment Fund works automatically, Congress has no occasion to 
review and consider payments made on behalf of these entities.269  
Granting FTCA coverage to non-federal government entities may be 
poor policy,270 but it is a political decision appropriately made by 
Congress under its power of appropriation. 
2.  Executive Branch Encroachment 
a.  Executive Branch Authority over the Judgment Fund 
The integrity of the Judgment Fund is dependent on the good 
faith of executive branch officers.  The key Judgment Fund provision 
appropriates money “to pay final judgments, awards, [and] compro-
 
dures required when submitting Swine Flu settlements for payment from the Judgment 
Fund). 
267 Congress made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for torts of tribal employees and contrac-
tors acting under certain contracts or agreements, giving them the FTCA’s “full protec-
tion and coverage.”  Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, Title III, § 314, 104 Stat. 
1915, 1959 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 450(f) (2012)); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-169, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT—ISSUES 
AFFECTING COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTS 25 fig. 5 (2000) [here-
inafter GAO/RCED-00-169] (depicting history of the Self-Determination Act provisions 
and subsequent amendments in graphic form); Joseph W. Gross, Comment, Help Me Help 
You:  Why Congress’s Attempt to Cover Torts Committed by Indian Tribal Contractors with the 
FTCA Hurts the Government and the Tribes, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 383, 393–94 (2012) (discussing 
Congress’s reasons for providing FTCA coverage to tribal contractors). 
268 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, § 3141 Contractor Liability for 
Injury or Loss of Property Arising out of Atomic Weapons Testing Programs, Pub. L. No. 
101-510, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990) (amended by Pub.L. No. 101-510, Div. C, Title XXXI, § 
3141, 104 Stat. 1837 (1990) and Pub. L. No. 113-66, Div. C, Title XXXI, § 3146(i)(2), 127 
Stat. 1081 (2013)) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2783 (formerly at 42 U.S.C. § 2212)); see also In 
re Consol.  U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 990–91 (discussing the legislative 
history of the bill that extended FTCA coverage to nuclear weapons contractors). 
   Congress provided analogous coverage to community health providers, albeit with a 
proviso that the Judgment Fund be reimbursed from a special Department of Health and 
Human Services fund.  Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-501, 106 Stat. 3268 (1992); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW, supra note 1, at 15-266. 
269 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 267, at 443 (noting that the “funds to pay tort judgments 
against tribal contractors” are “given out automatically through the Judgment Fund”). 
270 See President George H. W. Bush Statement on Signing Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 1559 (Nov. 5, 1990) 
(noting that use of the FTCA is inconsistent with tribal autonomy and Indian self deter-
mination); see also GAO/RCED-00-169, supra note 267, 36 app. IV (Dept. of Interior 
comments) (noting that FTCA coverage removes tribes’ incentive to reduce claims and 
that sometimes tribes or their employees do not cooperate in defending claims); Gross, 
supra note 267, at 400–03 (noting various practical problems of using the FTCA to cover 
torts of non-federal entities). 
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mise settlements….”271  Decisions regarding how to litigate, whether 
to appeal, and when to settle are made by executive branch officials, 
usually the Attorney General or officials under his direction or to 
whom he has delegated authority.  A lack of due care on their part 
could lead to payments from the Judgment Fund that are outside the 
parameters set by Congress. 
The Judgment Fund can pay only litigative awards—those that 
were or might be made in court.272  The Department of Justice has 
presumptive responsibility for all litigation of the United States and 
its agencies.273  Its statutory grant of authority states, “[e]xcept as oth-
erwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the Unit-
ed States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . . . is reserved to of-
ficers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the 
Attorney General.”274 
The Judgment Fund can pay awards or settlements only if they are 
“final.”275  A judgment is final for Judgment Fund purposes when the 
appellate process is finished.276  This happens when there is a final 
decision by a court of last resort, the time for filing an appeal expires, 
or the parties decide not to seek review.277  Only the Solicitor General 
has authority to determine “whether, and to what extent, appeals will 
be taken by the Government” from adverse decisions.278 
 
271 See 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (explaining that the statute applies only when payment is not au-
thorized from another source, the Secretary of the Treasury certifies it, and “the judg-
ment, award or settlement is payable” under a statute designated by Congress); see also su-
pra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
272 See, e.g., 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-34 
(noting that the Judgment Fund was enacted primarily to pay “court judgments and set-
tlements negotiated under authority of the Justice Department”); CRS JUDGMENT FUND, 
supra note 193, at 6–7 (distinguishing administrative awards “which are provided for by 
statute and paid from the agency’s appropriation”). 
273 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 15-222 to 15-223. 
274 28 U.S.C. § 516; see also 28 U.S.C. § 519 (authorizing the Attorney General to “supervise 
all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party”); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3106 (requiring agencies to consult with the Department of Justice and restricting hir-
ing of private attorneys).  The term “agency” includes “any corporation in which the 
United States has a proprietary interest….”  28 U.S.C. § 451.  The Department of Justice 
vigorously guards this authority.  2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, 
supra note 1, at 15-222 to 15-223. 
275 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a); see also 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, su-
pra note 1, at 14-36 (discussing the “finality” requirement). 
276 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-36. 
277 Id. (citing 73 Comp. Gen. 46 (1993)). 
278 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2013); see also United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 
2001) (noting that only the Solicitor General has the “right to control appeals of the 
United States”). 
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The Attorney General has broad authority to settle litigation un-
der his supervision279 and to delegate that settlement authority.280  He 
has delegated to Assistant Attorneys General the authority to 
“[a]ccept offers in compromise of, or settle administratively, claims 
against the United States in all cases in which the principal amount of 
the proposed settlement does not exceed $2,000,000,”281 and “to re-
delegate to subordinate division officials and United States Attorneys” 
that authority.282  For example, U.S. Attorneys can redelegate their 
authority to “Assistant United States Attorneys who supervise other 
Assistant United States Attorneys who handle civil litigation.”283 
The Attorney General also delegated authority to settle adminis-
trative tort claims to other Justice Department components284 and to 
some agencies that handle numerous claims.285  Thus, the Postal Ser-
vice and the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs have au-
thority up to $300,000, while the Departments of Health and Human 
Services, Transportation, and Homeland Security have authority up 
to $200,000, $100,000, and $50,000, respectively.286  All agencies have 
$25,000 in independent statutory authority under the FTCA to settle 
administrative claims.287  In practice, agencies can settle FTCA claims 
for an amount up to their authority, absent some complicating factor 
such as a new precedent or potential third party claim.288 
 
279 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2011) states: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, compromise settlements of claims referred to 
the Attorney General for defense of imminent litigation or suits against the United 
States, or against its agencies or officials upon obligations or liabilities of the Unit-
ed States, made by the Attorney General or any person authorized by him, shall be 
settled and paid in a manner similar to judgments in like causes and appropria-
tions or funds available for the payment of such judgments are hereby made avail-
able for the payment of such compromise settlements. 
280 28 U.S.C. § 510. 
281 28 C.F.R. § 0.160(a)(2). 
282 28 C.F.R. § 0.168(a).  The redelegation of authority to U.S. Attorneys to accept offers in 
compromise is limited to “cases in which the principal amount of the proposed settle-
ment does not exceed $1,000,000.”  28 C.F.R. § 0.168(d)(2). 
283 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civ. Div. Directive, No. 1-10 § 1(b)(2). 
284 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.172(a) (authorizing directors of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prison Indus-
tries, the United States Marshals Service, and the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives to settle tort claims up to $50,000). 
285 See 28 C.F.R. § 14. 
286 Id. 
287 28 U.S.C. § 2672.  The Judgment Fund pays administrative settlements that exceed 
$2,500; settlements for $2,500 or less are paid from agency funds.  Id.; see also JAYSON & 
LONGSTRETH, supra note 196, at § 17.12 (discussing payment of administrative awards). 
288 28 C.F.R. §  14.6(d).  FTCA administrative settlements that exceed the agency’s authoriza-
tion and FTCA lawsuit settlements that exceed a Justice Department attorney’s authority 
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Executive branch officers with this broad authority over litigation 
and settlements are in a position from which they might help favored 
plaintiffs by ignoring statutory limits and defenses, pulling punches in 
litigation, or settling claims for amounts unwarranted by the law and 
facts.289  Narratives about whether government attorneys might abuse 
that authority to benefit political allies vary with the writer and the 
focus.  Professor Todd David Peterson has forcefully suggested “there 
is no reason to believe that a Department that is committed to an ad-
vocacy model in advising the President on his constitutional authority 
would shrink from a settlement policy that permitted political judg-
ments to displace litigation risk assessments.”290  Jeffrey Axelrad, the 
former head of the Torts Branch in the Justice Department’s Civil Di-
vision, expressed a different view:  “It is to the Justice Department 
that the unpopular, hard task of guarding the [Judgment] Fund 
against abuse falls.  Eternal vigilance and reasoned, careful analysis 
have been the hallmark of the Justice Department’s exercise of this 
responsibility.”291 
 
must be formally approved by the Department of Justice officer with authority for that 
amount.  28 C.F.R. § 14.6(c); JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 196, at § 15.05(1). 
289 See Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power:  Why Congress Should Care About 
Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L. REV. 327, 331 (2009) (noting the secret 
nature of government settlement analysis); see also id. at 349 (explaining that the Depart-
ment of Justice “has the power to compromise and settle these claims for amounts that 
may not reflect their legal merit but rather the desire of the executive branch to compen-
sate plaintiffs whom they deem worthy”).  
290 Id. at 331. 
291 See Axelrad, supra note 4. 
   Certainly political pressure from within the executive branch has been applied with 
the intent of opening the Judgment Fund.  The previously discussed attempts of the De-
partment of Transportation and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
use the Judgment Fund to make EAJA payments had a political aspect.  See supra 206–218 
and accompanying text.  So did efforts of the Department of Energy to help nuclear 
weapons contractors secure FTCA coverage for their actions.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-
124, pt. 2, at 14–17 (1983) (letter from Dep’t of Energy General Counsel supporting con-
tractors’ proposal).  Executive branch officials in non-Justice agencies have done things 
for political reasons that seemingly undermine the government’s position in pending tort 
litigation.  See Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & the Federal Tort Claims Act:  An Approach for 
Government Attorneys, 8 ST. THOMAS U. L.J. 347, 368–70 (2011) (discussing actions of Sec-
retary of Energy Hazel O’Leary during trial of FTCA suit brought by Nevada Test Site 
workers alleging exposure to radiation).  These sorts of things are different in kind from 
Professor Peterson’s concern that Justice Department attorneys “may wish to compensate 
plaintiffs for political reasons or because the administration favors the plaintiff’s cause, 
even though the plaintiff’s legal claim is weak.”  Peterson, supra note 289, at 331; see also 
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government 
Lawyer:  The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 984–86 (1991) (discussing eth-
ical obligations of civil government attorneys to raise all applicable defenses). 
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b.  Single Event Settlements 
Government attorneys handling high profile cases, run-of-the-mill 
litigation, and administrative claims have the authority to settle those 
matters with Judgment Fund money.292  Department of Justice regula-
tions require documentation and approval of such settlements.293 
It is no secret that some private attorneys, acting to the detriment 
of their clients, settle cases for more (or less) than is warranted by the 
facts and the law.294  Their reasons range from fear of losing or being 
embarrassed,295 to hope of hiding their poor preparation or lack of 
qualifications,296 to desire to accommodate those with whom they will 
have future dealings such as local lawyers or a judge who demands 
settlement.297  There is also simple laziness and the wish to avoid the 
work, time, and stress that a trial requires.298  Lawyers may uncon-
sciously merge their self-interest into their analysis of whether a case 
should be tried.299 
Some government attorneys may wish to settle cases for similar 
reasons.  Two primary questions the Civil Division considers in de-
termining whether to approve a proposed settlement are whether the 
case is adequately prepared and whether settlement has been pro-
 
292 Peterson, supra note 289, at 349. 
293 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civ. Div. Directive No. 1-10. 
294 See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation:  Using Economics and 
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
269, 317–18 (1999) (noting that ethical rules are not always followed). 
295 See Tom Galbraith, Lawyer Behavior for Survival and Elegance, 33 LITIGATION 8, 13 (2006) 
(noting that some attorneys “can always find a rationale for settling a case he is afraid to 
lose at trial”); Sternlight, supra note 294, at 317–18 (explaining that psychological factors 
can impact an attorney’s motivation for settling a case). 
296 John Lande, Escaping from Lawyers’ Prison of Fear, 82 UMKC L. REV. 485, 489 (2014); see also 
Richard G. Spier, Professionalism in Mediation:  Avoiding Common Pitfalls, OR. ST. B. BULL., 
(Nov. 2013), https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/13nov/professionalism.html 
(noting that opponents can sense when an attorney fears trial). 
297 See Sternlight, supra note 294, at 328 (noting that attorneys may settle to foster amicable 
relationships with opposing counsel or opposing parties); see also Patrick E. Longan, Bu-
reaucratic Justice Meets ADR:  The Emerging Role for Magistrates As Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REV. 
712, 736 (1994) (recognizing that a “judge can play on the fears of the lawyers who have 
other cases to come before that judge”). 
298 Sternlight, supra note 294, at 328; see also LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY 
291 (1954) (noting that settlement is an option for attorney who “for personal rea-
sons . . . would a little rather not submit to ordeal by combat”) (cited in Glenn E. Brad-
ford, Losing, 58 J. MO. B. 208, 209 (2002)). 
299 See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Cost of Settlement:  The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Liti-
gation Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 859 (1990) (noting susceptibility of inexperienced 
lawyers); Sternlight, supra note 294, at 317–18 (noting the impact of psychological factors 
on an attorney’s willingness to settle a case). 
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posed because the attorney wants to avoid going to trial.300  Docu-
mented examples where government attorneys have settled to avoid 
trial are rare.  One such case is White v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 
in which an Assistant U.S. Attorney avoided an imminent trial by lying 
to the judge, deceitfully stating that a $2,000,020 wrongful death set-
tlement had been approved by his “superiors in Washington.”301  This 
lie was remarkable because it was sure to come to light “[w]hen pay-
ment as required under the agreement was not received.”302  It was 
discovered, a motion to enforce the unapproved settlement was de-
nied,303 and six months later, summary judgment was granted for the 
government on liability.304 
It is easy to be generous with other people’s money,305 a truism 
that might tempt a government attorney facing a very sympathetic 
plaintiff apparently barred from suing the government.306  In the 
normal situation, a client’s interest in a favorable settlement would 
counterbalance its attorney’s desire to settle for more (or less) than 
the litigative value of the case.  That is not the case when Judgment 
Fund money is sought under a statute that does not require reim-
bursement because the client agency has no financial interest in the 
outcome.307  Despite the ease with which such cases might be settled 
and the evident “incentive to yield to the perceived special need du 
jour,”308 there is very little factual support for the notion that govern-
ment attorneys inappropriately use the Judgment Fund to settle indi-
vidual claims or cases.309  This circumstance is attributable to the pro-
 
300 See generally 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civil Div. Directive No. 1-10 § 2(b) (requiring a 
“a detailed description of the matter, the United States Attorney’s recommendation, the 
agency’s recommendation where applicable, and a full statement of the reasons there-
for”). 
301 See White v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 639 F. Supp. 82, 88–89 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 815 F.2d 
697 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting settlement conference transcript). 
302 Id. at 84. 
303 Id. 
304 White v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 656 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 815 F.2d 697 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
305 Cf. In re Erewhon, Inc., 21 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (“When dealing with other 
people’s money, there is apt to be less regard for exercising the same scrutiny of charges 
that one might render when dealing purely with one’s own expenses.”). 
306 See generally Peterson, supra note 289, at 348 (discussing how “the worthiness of the cause 
is not always congruent with the meritoriousness of the claim”). 
307 See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also Axelrad, supra note 4. 
308 Axelrad, supra note 4. 
309 But cf. infra Part III.2.c (discussing EAJA settlements in “sue and settle” litigation). 
   Professor Peterson identified as a possible example of executive branch overreach 
the dispute regarding the return of money Pakistan paid for undelivered F-16 fighters.  
Peterson, supra note 289, at 367–68.  Pursuant to a U.S. Government approved contract, 
in 1989 Pakistan paid General Dynamics $658,000,000 for the fighters; delivery of this 
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fessionalism of those attorneys,310 to the safeguards built into the sys-
tem that require detailed written explanations of settlements and ap-
proval of larger settlements by attorneys not directly involved in the 
litigation311 and, perhaps, to the difficulty of detecting settlements in 
which it was done.312 
c.  “Sue & Settle” Environmental Litigation 
There are indications that the Judgment Fund has been used to 
pay EAJA fees that should have been paid from agency appropria-
tions.313  The proposed Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2003 
recognized in its findings “the practice of Federal agencies of paying 
their EAJA liabilities from the General Treasury rather than their own 
agency budgets, relieving those agencies of the financial consequenc-
es of their misconduct (i.e., EAJA liability) and burdening the Feder-
al budget unnecessarily.”314  The availability of the Judgment Fund to 
pay EAJA fees is part of the mix in “sue and settle” environmental liti-
gation.315 
 
military hardware was barred by statute when the President was “unable to certify that Pa-
kistan had not developed nuclear weapons,” but the money was not returned.  Id. at 367.  
In 1998, prior to suit being filed, the Clinton Administration agreed to pay $324,600,000 
from the Judgment Fund to settle Pakistan’s claim; Pakistan also received $142,300,000 
from other sources.  Id.  The lack of specific information about the legal arguments 
makes it difficult to analyze the merits of the decision to settle with Judgment Fund mon-
ey.  Id. at 368. 
310 See Axelrad, supra note 4 (describing the role of Department of Justice attorneys in guard-
ing against misuse of Judgment Fund money). 
311 See, e.g., White, 639 F. Supp. at 88 (holding that failure to obtain required approvals made 
a purported settlement invalid and unenforceable); 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civil 
Div. Directive No. 1-10 §§ 1, 2 (2014) (delegating settlement authority and requiring set-
tlement memoranda). 
312 See Peterson, supra note 289, at 369–73 (explaining why the judicial and legislative 
branches are poorly situated to monitor for such settlements). 
313 See Baier, supra note 226, at 35 n.265, 63 n.436 (noting that EAJA fees are not always paid 
as the statute requires). 
314 See H.R. 2282, § 2(a)(6), 108th Cong. (2003), quoted in Baier, supra note 226, at 61–63 
n.433 (noting that a nearly identical bill was introduced in 2005). 
315 See e.g., Regulatory Chaos:  Finding Legislative Solutions to Benefit Jobs and the Economy:  Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 68 (2011) 
(statement of William L. Kovacs, Senior Vice President, Environment, Technology and 
Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (suggesting that agencies in “sue and 
settle” litigation agree to pay attorney fees from the Judgment Fund); Jenna Greene, Feds 
Paid Billions in Settlements Last Year, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 2012 at 2 (noting use of Judgment 
Fund to pay attorneys’ fees in “sue and settle” cases); Jillian Kay Melchior, The Enviro-Fix Is 
In, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 23, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/
349111/enviro-fix-jillian-kay-melchior (referencing the use of the Judgment Fund to pay 
attorneys’ fees). 
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For an agency entering a “sue and settle” settlement, a key issue is 
whether plaintiff’s expenses and attorneys’ fees will be paid from the 
Judgment Fund or agency appropriations.  Under EAJA, if a fee-
shifting statute or the common law creates a right to such fees from 
the United States, those fees would be paid from the Judgment Fund 
unless the basis of the award is that the agency acted in “bad faith,” in 
which case they would be paid from agency funds.316  If no such fee-
shifting statute or common law right applies, EAJA fees can be paid to 
a prevailing party, but only from agency appropriations317 and only if 
the agency’s position was not “substantially justified.”318  When a suit 
involves both statutes that authorize attorneys’ fees and those that do 
not, the Office of Legal Counsel determined that all fees should be 
allotted to the statute authorizing fees (and be paid from the Judg-
ment Fund) if claims under the statues were closely related and con-
tributed to a successful, significant prosecution.319  If the claims are 
unrelated, fees are allotted between agency appropriations and the 
Judgment Fund.320 
In analyzing whether the Judgment Fund has been misused, the 
interesting question is how the source of funding decision is made 
when the answer is not obvious:  how is it decided whether fees will 
be paid from the Judgment Fund or agency appropriations when a 
settlement involves claims involving different facts and statutes such 
that work on one issue did not impact the other, or when there is 
some indication that the agency acted in “bad faith” or was “substan-
tially justified” in its position?  It appears that this decision is typically 
made when the parties negotiate the settlement.321  As Bureau of 
 
316 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (c)(2). 
317 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(4) (for cases in litigation); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 
U.S.C. § 2412(c), (d)(3), (d)(4) (for administrative adjudications). 
318 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (B), (d)(3). 
319 Payment of Attorney’s Fees in Litigation Involving Successful Challenges to Federal 
Agency Action Arising Under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Citizen Suit Pro-
visions of the Endangered Species Act [ESA], 24 Op. O.L.C. 311, 314 (2000). 
320 See id. at 321 (“Under this approach, hours and costs necessary to both counts should be 
assigned to the [agency appropriation] for attorneys’ fees purposes, leaving only the 
hours and costs necessary only to the APA claim to be paid [from the Judgment Fund].”); 
see also Payment of Attorney’s Fees and Cost in Jean M. Kovalich v. Defense Investigative Service, B-
231771, (Comp. Gen. Dec. 7, 1988) (concluding that EAJA settlement of attorneys’ fees 
must be paid from agency appropriation although related back-pay award was paid from 
the Judgment Fund). 
321 See e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-650, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION:  
CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS OVER TIME 22 (2011) [hereinafter GAO-11-
650] (noting that “[a]s part of the payment process, Justice negotiated payment amounts 
with prevailing parties”); Baier, supra note 226, at 46 (noting EAJA fees are frequently set-
tled in an addendum to a stipulation identifying a prevailing party “or as part of the over-
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Land Management Director Robert Abbey explained, in practice 
“[the money] can come out of either fund. . . . It is part of the nego-
tiations, it is part of the settlement discussion.”322  Those negotiations 
typically include plaintiff’s counsel and attorneys from both the 
agency and the Department of Justice.323  The prevalent expectation is 
that most environmental fee awards will be paid by the Judgment 
Fund.324  The most detailed information available is in a 2011 Gov-
ernment Accountability Office study that examined EAJA payments 
made in EPA cases.325  Its included tables show that from December 
2005 through September 2010,326 the Judgment Fund paid 
$8,379,302.63, or 86% of the total awarded in those cases, while EPA 
appropriations paid $1,371,228, amounting to 14%.327 
Deciding the source of payment decision in settlement negotia-
tions is troublesome unless the government attorneys are scrupulous 
in assessing which statute properly authorizes the payment.  The 
Judgment Fund statute is limited to paying awards “not otherwise 
provided for.”328  A key principal of appropriations law is that “[t]here 
is only one proper source of funds in any given case.  There is no 
election to be made.”329  Parties cannot properly stipulate or agree to 
change which government account will pay a settlement.330  The rea-
son is clear:  allowing them to do so “might encourage settlements 
 
all settlement”); Korpics et al., supra note 229, at 10990 (explaining that either a consent 
decree or judgment is necessary for an award of fees). 
322 See Conserving America’s Land and Heritage:  Department of the Interior FY 2011 Budget Request:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, pt. 6, 111th Cong. 86 (2010) [hereinafter Interior FY 2011 Budget Hrg.], 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg66892/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg66892.pdf 
(answering the question of whether EAJA fees “come out of your [BLM] budget or . . . 
out of the Judgment fund . . . ?”). 
323 See id. at 87 (statement of Director Abbey regarding BLM settlements); see also GAO-11-
650, supra note 321, at 25 (noting that the Justice Department frequently attempts to ne-
gotiate attorneys’ fees rather than litigate them). 
324 See GAO-11-650, supra note 321, at 22 (agreeing as to “most claims”); Korpics et al., supra 
note 229, at 10996 (agreeing as to “virtually all fee awards”). 
325 See generally GAO-11-650, supra note 321, at 3–5. 
326 See id. at 40–49 (referencing ten pages of tables listing, inter alia, case names, plaintiffs, 
and amounts paid); see also id. at 4 (noting that the report covered the period for which 
relevant EPA payment data were available). 
327 See id. at 40–49 (calculating the sums by adding payments); see also Ron Arnold, How 
Washington Pays Big Green to Sue the Government, WASH. EXAMINER, Aug. 23, 2011, 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/how-washington-pays-big-green-to-sue-the-
government/article/40827 (using the tables in the GAO report to calculate that 82% of 
the money paid went to environmental organizations). 
328 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1). 
329 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-40. 
330 CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 10. 
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driven by source-of-funds considerations rather than the best interests 
of the United States.”331  Government attorneys negotiating EAJA set-
tlements must balance fealty to the Judgment Fund and the agency’s 
interest in preserving program funds.  In a three-attorney conversa-
tion, agency counsel and plaintiff’s attorney may have common 
ground to advocate for payment from the Judgment Fund; that would 
conserve agency appropriations and meet plaintiff’s desire for fees.332  
Indeed, in a slightly different field a respected treatise advises that to 
preserve access to the Judgment Fund consent decrees should avoid 
mentioning EAJA.333  The available information does not show how 
conscientious the Justice Department has been in considering and 
protecting the Judgment Fund when it enters or approves fee settle-
ments with environmental organizations. 
d.  Class Settlements & Program Creation 
On occasion, issues involving  “creative” use of the Judgment 
Fund have arisen in a class action context.  Examples of such litiga-
tion where political concerns may have tempered the government’s 
defense include the Pigford black farmer litigation,334 the Japanese 
Latin Americans litigation,335 and suits brought by Native American 
farmers, Hispanic farmers, and female farmers.336 
The Pigford black farmer litigation had two discrete phases, both 
arising from allegations that black farmers were treated unfairly in 
USDA programs for loans, crop payments, disaster payments, and in 
investigations of those allegations.337  Pigford I began in August 1997, 
 
331 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-35 (citing 13 
Op. O.L.C. 118, 125 (1989)). 
332 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial And Administrative Law of the H. Comm. 
on The Judiciary on H.R. 1996, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of Jeffrey Axelrad, Profes-
sorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School) (noting that an agen-
cy involved in EAJA fee settlement has no incentive to reduce payments from the Judg-
ment Fund). 
333 See RONALD A. KIENLEN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES § 9:9 Consent Judgments 
(2013 ed.) (explaining that for consent judgments “to avoid difficulties with payments 
from the judgment fund . . . it is best to avoid reference to [EAJA] fees and interest”). 
334 See generally Peterson, supra note 289, at 358–62 (describing the “case famously known as 
the Black Farmers case”). 
335 See generally id. at 362–66 (discussing the Japanese Latin American case). 
336 See generally JODY FEDER & TADLOCK COWAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40988, GARCIA V. 
VILSACK:  A POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A USDA DISCRIMINATION CASE 1 (2013) [here-
inafter CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS] (describing the minority and female farmer litigation 
against the USDA). 
337 See, e.g., Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 85–88 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 
(D.C. Cir. 2000), enforcement denied sub nom., Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2008); TADLOCK COWAN & JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD 
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when Timothy Pigford filed suit under the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (“ECOA”) seeking class relief.338  In October 1998, the court certi-
fied a class “for purposes of determining liability” and injunctive re-
lief.339  Although plaintiffs’ claims had some apparent merit,340 many 
were barred by the ECOA’s statute of limitations.341  The Justice De-
partment Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) was asked whether the 
government could waive the limitations defense and settle the 
claims.342  OLC reasoned that because the statute of limitations was 
part of the terms of the consent to the waiver of sovereign immunity 
“established by Congress,” “modifying the terms of consent re-
quire[d] legislative action.”343  It concluded, “ECOA’s statute of limi-
tations applies to both administrative and litigative settlements of 
ECOA claims, and it may not be waived by the executive branch.”344  
Congress resolved this jurisdictional problem by including a targeted 
waiver of the statute of limitations in an appropriations bill that be-
came law on October 21, 1998, effectively authorizing plaintiffs’ 
claims.345 
 
CASES:  USDA SETTLEMENT  OF DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS 2 (2013) [here-
inafter CRS PIGFORD CASES]; see generally Sharon LaFraniere, U.S. Opens Spigot After Farmers 
Claim Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/
26/us/farm-loan-bias-claims-often-unsupported-cost-us-millions.html (providing a thor-
ough discussion of the litigation and the politics surrounding it). 
338 See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 2 (noting that a similar suit was later filed by 
Cecil Brewington). 
339 Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 351–52 (D.D.C. 1998), modifying the class in Pigford v. 
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D.D.C.1999). 
340 See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 2 (noting that the discrimination claims were 
corroborated by a 1994 USDA-commissioned study).  But cf. LaFraniere, supra note 337, 
at 5 (noting that two 1997 government reports did not find “evidence of ongoing, system-
ic discrimination”). 
341 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (stating that the statute of limitations is five years with some ex-
ceptions). 
342 Statute of Limitations & Settlement of Equal Credit Opportunity Act Discrimination 
Claims Against the Dep’t of Agric., 22 Op. O.L.C. 11, 1998 WL 1180049, at *1 (1998). 
343 Id. at *3. 
344 Id. at *15.  OLC also concluded that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable 
tolling.  Id. at *14.  This conclusion was affirmed in a subsequent OLC opinion.  See gener-
ally Waiver of Statutes of Limitations in Connection with Claims Against the Dep’t of 
Agric., 22 Op. O.L.C. 127 (1998). 
345 See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (waiving the statute of limitations); id. at § 741(e) 
(indicating that the waiver applied only to “nonemployment related complaint[s] that 
w[ere] filed with the Department of Agriculture before July 1, 1997 and allege[] discrim-
ination at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 1981 and ending Decem-
ber 31, 1996 . . . .”). 
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The newly extended statute of limitations346 and the 1998 decision 
that certified plaintiffs’ class347 made a negotiated settlement practi-
cable.348  In April of 1999, the court approved a consent decree estab-
lishing a multi-track claims process that gave Track A plaintiffs who 
had “little or no documentary evidence . . . a virtually automatic cash 
payment of $50,000,” and allowed those with better evidence to re-
cover in Track B whatever damages they could establish.349  The con-
sent decree laid out specific procedures and administrators’ respon-
sibilities.350  It defined what Track A claimants must establish by 
substantial evidence to an independent adjudicator who would de-
cide on the papers.351  Track B claimants had to show discrimination 
by a preponderance of the evidence; they could present evidence and 
the government could cross-examine and argue.352  Either side could 
petition for reexamination of a decision.353  Attorneys’ fees and ex-
penses were paid under fee shifting statutes rather than from the set-
tlement.354  Claimants were to submit claims by October 12, 1999, with 
provision for late-filing claimants to file by September 15, 2000, upon 
a showing that “extraordinary circumstances” caused the late submis-
sion.355  The cash settlements, exceeding $770,000,000, were paid 
from the Judgment Fund.356 
 
346 Id. 
347 See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 350–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (certifying the class pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)). 
348 See Stephen Carpenter, The USDA Discrimination Cases:  Pigford, In Re Black Farmers, 
Keepseagle, Garcia, and Love, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 15–16 (2012) (noting the previous 
problem posed by the statute of limitations). 
349 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 95 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) and enforcement denied sub nom., Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008). 
350 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06469R, PIGFORD SETTLEMENT:  THE ROLE 
OF THE COURT-APPOINTED MONITOR 5–9 (2006) [hereinafter GAO-06469R] (summariz-
ing Pigford I consent decree procedures); Carpenter, supra note 348, at 18–19 (same). 
351 See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 18–19 (explaining that an independent adjudicator 
would decide claims based on a determination that the claimant’s paper record met a 
substantial evidence burden). 
352 See GAO-06469R, supra note 350, at 9 (explaining the burden claimants must meet in a 
Track B claim and the ways in which the government can challenge these claims). 
353 See id. (explaining the process for challenging an adjudication by filing a petition with a 
monitor). 
354 See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 20 (explaining that fees for the class counsel were de-
termined by fee shifting statutes, rather than by taking a percentage of the payment made 
to the class). 
355 See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 4. 
356 See id. at 3, 6 (indicating that the settlement was paid from the Judgment Fund).  Total 
benefits exceeded $1,000,000,000.  Id. at 7.  Track B claimants recovered between $52,000 
and $1,500,000.  See GAO-06469R, supra note 350, at 9. 
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A large number of the late claims were not resolved on their mer-
its; only 2,116 of 73,800 late claims were allowed to proceed.357  Dissat-
isfaction with these outcomes led to political efforts to reopen the 
process.358  Finally, Congress included in the 2008 Farm Bill a new 
procedure for those claims to be decided “on the merits.”359  Congress 
set the maximum amount to be paid under the new statute, and ap-
propriated for that purpose, $100,000,000.360  The subsequent suits 
were consolidated in Pigford II and the parties agreed to a 
$1,250,000,000 settlement in February 2010.361  The claims process es-
tablished in the Pigford II settlement was similar to that in Pigford I.362  
It differed in that neither side could appeal and attorneys’ fees and 
expenses came from the settlement’s lump sum.363  Because the 
Judgment Fund can be used only to make payments “not otherwise 
provided for”364 and Congress had appropriated money in the 2008 
farm bill to pay the Pigford II claims, the Judgment Fund could not be 
used to pay the settlement.365  Several attempts to appropriate the 
$1,150,000,000 needed to complete the settlement failed.366  In late 
2010, Congress enacted the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 that ap-
propriated the money for Pigford II and authorized payment of 
$2,000,000,000 from the Judgment Fund for the Cobell v. Salazar class 
action settlement regarding government mismanagement of hun-
dreds of thousands of Individual Indian Money trust accounts.367 
 
357 See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 5 (noting that 66,000 late claims were submitted 
by the September 15 deadline). 
358 See LaFraniere, supra note 337, at 11 (noting nine years of “concerted effort”). 
359 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14012(b), 122 
Stat. 1651 (“Any Pigford claimant who has not previously obtained a determination on 
the merits of a Pigford claim may, in a civil action brought in the United States Distict 
Court for the District of Columbia, obtain that determination.”); CRS PIGFORD CASES, su-
pra note 337, at 7. 
360 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 §§ 14012(c)(2), 14012(i)(1). 
361 CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7. 
362 See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 29–31 (describing the Pigford II claims process). 
363 See id. at 31 (noting authority for a court-appointed ombudsman). 
364 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1); see supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
365 See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7–8 (noting that Congress had appropriated 
$100,000,000 for Pigford II claims in the 2008 Farm Bill). 
366 See id. at 10–11 (discussing unsuccessful legislative efforts). 
367 Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291 § 201, 124 Stat. 3064 (2010);  see also 
Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice:  The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts, 
and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZAGA L. REV. 609, 620–21 (2010/2011) (describing the 
number and nature of the trust accounts).  The Cobell litigation had a long, complicated, 
and contentious history.  See Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting 
the case was then in its thirteenth year with an “increasingly difficult to summa-
rize . . . factual and procedural background”); Merjian, supra at 619–54 (providing a 
thorough summary of the litigation); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Professor Richard J. Pierce’s 
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The Pigford litigation is not an example of executive branch over-
reach, although a strong political current ran through the settlement 
negotiations.368  President Bill Clinton and President Barack Obama 
favored the farmers’ claims, and their political appointees actively 
supported the settlements over the objections of some career offi-
cials.369  But the payments were made in a manner that respected the 
Judgment Fund.  The settlement in Pigford I was appropriately paid 
from the Judgment Fund because Congress allowed the suit when it 
extended the ECOA statute of limitations.370  In contrast, the Pigford II 
settlement was not paid from the Judgment Fund because the stat-
ute’s “not otherwise provided for” requirement was not met.371  Con-
gress appropriated money for the Pigford II settlement with full 
knowledge of the terms of the agreement. 
The same analysis applies to another case where political concerns 
may have influenced the Department of Justice’s settlement position, 
that of the Japanese Latin Americans.372  The plaintiffs were people of 
Japanese ancestry living in Latin America who were interred during 
World War II in the United States at its request.373  Plaintiffs sought to 
make claims under the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,374 the statute that 
authorized a formal apology and payment of $20,000 to Japanese 
Americans who had been interred during the war.375  The govern-
ment had a strong defense to claims of the Japanese Latin Americans 
because the statute authorized compensation only to “a United States 
citizen or a permanent resident alien.”376  Nonetheless, the govern-
ment agreed to settle each plaintiff’s claim for an apology and $5,000, 
 
Reign of Error in the Administrative Law Review, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 242–43 (2005) (ad-
dressing particular actions of the judge initially assigned the case). 
368 See generally LaFraniere, supra note 337 (providing a thorough discussion of the black 
farmer ligation, its political aspects, and its susceptibility to fraud). 
369 See id. at 6 (quoting an attorney statement that the settlement “was more a political deci-
sion than a litigation decision”). 
370 See Peterson, supra note 289, at 362 (noting with approval that this process respected 
“Congress’s appropriation authority”). 
371 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1); see also CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7–8 (explaining that 
the “not otherwise provided for” requirement was not met because in the 2008 farm bill, 
Congress had made $100 million available for those claims). 
372 See Peterson, supra note 289, at 362–66 (citing Mochizuki v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 54 
(1998)). 
373 See id. at 362–63 (describing the removal of Japanese Latin Americans to the United 
States). 
374 See generally Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1989b). 
375 Id.; Peterson, supra note 289, at 365–66. 
376 Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 108(2)(A); see Peterson, supra note 289, at 366 (explaining 
further that the Japanese-Latin Americans were not eligible for redress payments under 
that provision). 
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to be paid from the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund.377  The set-
tlement had political overtones and it may have been entered over 
the objections of some within the Department of Justice.378  But, be-
cause the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund was depleted, the set-
tlement was funded only when Congress appropriated $4,300,000 to 
fund it.379  Accordingly, like the Pigford and Cobell litigation, in the end 
the executive branch paid only money Congress had appropriated for 
that purpose. 
The Obama Administration followed a different path in other 
cases.  Native-American farmers,380 Hispanic farmers,381 and women 
farmers382 filed class action suits against USDA alleging unlawful dis-
crimination and ECOA claims similar to those raised in the Pigford lit-
igation.383  In the context of settling those cases the Administration 
used Judgment Fund money to fully fund claims processes that were 
similar to those established in the Pigford litigation.384  As explained 
below, the amounts paid from the Judgment Fund for these pro-
grams seem out of proportion to the government’s litigative risk. 
In the Keepseagle litigation, Native Americans brought a class ac-
tion suit alleging USDA discrimination in reviewing applications for 
 
377 Mochizuki, 41 Fed. Cl. at 56–57; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Japanese Latin Ameri-
cans to Receive Compensation for Internment During World War II (June 12, 1998), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/276.htm.html.  This fund was established by 
§ 104 of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. 
378 See Peterson, supra note 289, at 366 (quoting the Justice Management Division General 
Counsel, who wrote that he saw “virtually no litigative risk” regarding the situation with 
the Japanese-Latin Americans).  
379 See 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57, 
100 § 3021; Peterson, supra note 289, at 366 n.194 (suggesting that Congress “had little 
choice but to [appropriate the money]”). 
380 See Keepseagle v. Glickman, 194 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000) (denying a motion to assign 
case to the judge who had approved the consent decree in Pigford I). 
381 See Garcia v. Veneman, 211 F.R.D. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying class certification of 
Hispanic farmers). 
382 See Love v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub 
nom. Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (denying class certification of female 
farmers). 
383 See In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 791–92 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting similarity of the four 
cases); CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 1 (acknowledging allegations of discrimi-
nation by these groups).  All three groups were specifically identified in a non-binding 
“sense of Congress” provision in the 2008 Farm Bill which urged “an expeditious and 
just” resolution of pending farmer discrimination claims against USDA.  See Food, Con-
servation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14011, 122 Stat. 923 (identifying 
“Native American, Hispanic, and female farmers or ranchers, based on racial, ethnic, or 
gender discrimination in farm program participation”); CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 
336, at 12–13. 
384 See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 13–32 (discussing similarities and differences in claims 
procedures). 
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farm loans or benefits programs and in investigating complaints of 
discrimination.385  They sought equitable and monetary relief386 and 
incorrectly designated the Pigford litigation as a related matter.387  In 
2001, Judge Emmett G. Sullivan “certifie[d] plaintiffs’ class only as to 
plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief” and deferred 
the question of certifying a class seeking monetary relief.388  In 2010, 
the parties agreed to a $760,000,000 settlement,389 including 
$680,000,000 paid from the Judgment Fund.390 
The Keepseagle settlement agreement, a forty-seven page docu-
ment,391 established “an administrative claims process” similar to the 
Pigford process.392  It spelled out procedures for a two-tier, non-judicial 
process that included requirements for class membership, facts a 
claimant must establish to recover under Track A or B, and directives 
for how to evaluate each claim.393  The Track A procedures provided 
that a claimant would recover $50,000 cash upon showing of a basic 
claim to a neutral arbiter who would review a paper record on a sub-
stantial evidence standard; USDA could not provide records or ar-
guments to dispute the claim.394  Track B claimants could recover up 
to $250,000 in an arbitration in which they had a preponderance of 
the evidence burden of proof.395  The settlement also required USDA 
 
385 See In re Veneman, 309 F.3d at 791 (noting plaintiffs had proceeded under ECOA, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Administrative Procedures Act). 
386 Id. 
387 See Keepseagle v. Glickman, 194 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs’ designa-
tion of their case as related to the Pigford litigation). 
388 Keepseagle v. Veneman, No. Civ.A.9903119EGS1712, 2001 WL 34676944, at *14 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 12, 2001); see also CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 348, at 11 (summarizing the 
case). 
389 CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 348, at 11. 
390 News Release No. 0539.10, U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agriculture Secretary Vilsack and Attorney 
General Holder Announce Settlement Agreement with Native American Farmers Who Claim to Have 
Faced Discrimination by USDA in Past Decades (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.usda.
gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2010/10/0539.xml&printable=true&cont
entidonly=true. 
391 Settlement Agreement, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-3119 2015 WL 1969814 (D.D.C. May 
4, 2015) [hereinafter Keepseagle Settlement Agreement], http://www.indianfarmclass.
com/Documents/SettlementAgreement.pdf. 
392 See Love v. Vilsack, 908 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting the process was 
“similar, though not identical”). 
393 Keepseagle Settlement Agreement, supra note 391, at 9–10, 14–25. 
394 Id. at 7, 21–23. 
395 Id. at 7, 23. 
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to undertake a number of steps to improve services to and communi-
cations with Native American farmers.396 
The Keepseagle settlement did not reflect the strength of the gov-
ernment’s litigative position.  Because the plaintiffs’ class had not 
been certified for monetary relief, plaintiffs faced the prospect of hav-
ing to separately litigate each claim.397  Such a failed class action 
would typically have very little settlement value.398  Nonetheless, the 
government settled for $760,000,000 (including a Settlement Fund of 
$680,000,000) which, according to plaintiffs’ attorneys, gave plaintiffs 
“about 98% of what [they] could possibly have won at trial….”399  This 
proved to be a vast overpayment.  Although the complaint had pre-
dicted at least 19,000 claimants,400 only 4,472 farmers perfected their 
claims.401  A total of $299,999,288 was paid from the Settlement Fund 
that had been established with Judgment Fund money,402 leaving 
$380,000,712403 at the end of the claims process.404  The parties had 
expected the remainder to be only “a couple of million.”405  Because 
no provision had been included in the settlement agreement for re-
version of excess money to the United States406 and the remainder was 
 
396 See id. at 33–38 (enhancing existing programs and creating a Council for Native American 
Farming, a USDA ombudsman for Native American and other socially disadvantaged 
farmers, and new reporting requirements). 
397 See Garcia v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Garcia 
v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting difficulty of resolving similar ECOA 
claims even after class certification for liability in the Pigford litigation). 
398 See Scott E. Gant, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Inter-
locutory Class Certification Rulings, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 249, 249 (2004) (noting that 
“denial of certification often means the end of the case”); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski 
Trueblood, Rule 23(f):  A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 
279 (2008) (“[C]lass certification decisions may make or break a case:  Where a class is 
not certified, the plaintiffs (and their lawyer) may not have the will—or the resources—to 
continue with a litigation that [may] yield only a small recovery and little basis for an 
award of substantial attorneys’ fees.”). 
399 See Keepseagle, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://www.cohenmilstein.com/cases/95/keepseagle 
   (last visited Aug. 21, 2015) (alluding to plaintiffs’ economist’s report). 
400 Fifth Amended Class Action Complaint at 163 ¶ 143, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-
03199, 2001 WL 35985330 (D.D.C. June 27, 2001). 
401 Plaintiffs’ Status Report at 1, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. June 12, 
2013) (reporting 4380 Track A and 92 Track B final determinations, 57 untimely claims, 
and 731 defective or incomplete claims). 
402 Plaintiffs’ Status Report at 2–3, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 
2013) (reporting 3587 Track A claims [$224,187,500], 14 Track B claims [$3,364,647], 
service awards to named plaintiffs [$950,000], and attorneys’ fees and costs 
[$60,800,000]). 
403 Id. at 3. 
404 Status Conference at 4, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2013). 
405 Id. (comment of plaintiffs’ counsel). 
406 Id. at 16 (comment of plaintiffs’ counsel). 
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so large, the parties faced a conundrum with how to dispose of it.407  
The significant point from the Judgment Fund perspective is that 
over $380,000,000 from the Judgment Fund, more than half the set-
tlement amount,408 will be used for some purpose other than paying 
class members’ claims.409 
In Garcia v. Veneman410 and Love v. Veneman,411 class action suits 
similar to Pigford and Keepseagle were filed by Hispanic farmers and 
woman farmers, respectively.  Garcia and Love, both alleging discrimi-
nation in farm loans and benefits programs and in investigation of 
complaints of discrimination, were assigned to the same judge and 
followed a similar path.412  In both cases, the district courts’ decisions 
to deny class certification were affirmed on appeal.413  With the Janu-
ary 19, 2010 Supreme Court denial of certiorari on those decisions, 
the only means left for a Garcia or Love plaintiff to pursue an ECOA 
claim would have been to litigate each claim individually.414  For the 
next year, the Department of Justice declined to settle Garcia or Love 
on a class-wide basis but expressed willingness to settle individual 
claims.415 
 
407 See Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199, 2015 WL 1969814 at *2 (D.D.C. May 4, 2015) 
(discussing history of the settlement agreement); Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 307 F.R.D. 233, 
238 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting disagreement among Native American groups as to how to 
handle excess funds). 
408 See Status Conference at 29, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 
2013) (noting that fact and commenting that it “was shocking . . . [that the projected set-
tlement amount] happens to be off $380 million dollars”). 
409 As Judge Sullivan observed in denying a motion to modify the settlement, “[a]lthough a 
$380,000,000 donation by the federal government to charities serving Native American 
farmers and ranchers might well be in the public interest, the Court doubts that the 
judgment fund from which this money came was intended to serve such a purpose.”  
Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. CV 99-3119 (EGS), 2015 WL 4510837, at *3 (D.D.C. July 24, 
2015). 
410 211 F.R.D. 15, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2002). 
411 224 F.R.D. 240, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2004). 
412 See CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 11 (noting cases’ common history). 
413 See Love, 224 F.R.D. at 242 (denying class certification for lack of commonality), aff’d in 
part, remanded in part sub nom. Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Garcia v. 
Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 8, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying class certification for lack of 
commonality), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 637 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (affirming because “the failure to investigate a discrimination complaint is not a 
‘credit transaction’ within the meaning of ECOA”).  Both cases were remanded for de-
termination of whether a failure to investigate violated the Administrative Procedure Act.  
Love, 439 F.3d at 733; Garcia, 444 F.3d at 637.  The district court’s decisions against plain-
tiffs on that issue were affirmed in a consolidated appeal.  Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519, 
521 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Garcia v. Vilsack, 558 U.S. 1158 (2010). 
414 CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 8. 
415 Id. at 6;  see also Timothy J. Burger, DOJ and Agriculture Spar Over Hispanic Farmers Settlement, 
MAIN JUSTICE (May 3, 2010),  http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/05/03/doj-and-
agriculture-spar-over-hispanic-farmers-settlement/ (quoting Justice spokesperson as say-
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On February 25, 2011, USDA and the Department of Justice uni-
laterally announced a claims program for Hispanic farmers and fe-
male farmers, including “at least $1.33 billion from the Judgment 
Fund, plus $160 million in debt relief, to implement a unified, non-
judicial claims resolution process.”416  On January 25, 2012, the gov-
ernment announced a revised plan.417  The charter for this system is 
the “Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims” (“Frame-
work”).418  The Framework was similar to the Pigford and Keepseagle 
processes but “differed in several respects, including the absence of 
judicial supervision or class counsel, less monetary relief, a more on-
erous burden of proof, and relief for a more limited category of 
claims.”419  It had two tiers, with awards capped at $50,000 and 
$250,000.420  The Framework is nineteen pages long and provided, in-
ter alia, for:  voluntary participation by claimants who may choose to 
instead pursue a judicial remedy; an independent adjudicator to de-
cide claims on a written record; written responses by the agency; and 
no right to appeal.421  Attorneys’ fees were to be paid by the claim-
ant.422  The Framework provided that “[c]ash awards and tax relief 
will be paid from the Judgment Fund.”423 
The litigative risk posed by Garcia and Love hardly justified the 
government’s decision to establish this $1,333,000,000 claims pro-
 
ing that because of the denial of class certification “we will not be able to negotiate a 
class-wide settlement”). 
416 Secretary Vilsack’s Efforts to Address Discrimination at USDA, USDA OFFICE OF THE ASST. SECT. 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.ascr.usda.gov/about_cr_background.html (last visited on 
May 29, 2015); News Transcript, Release No. 0100.11 USDA Office of Communications, 
Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack and Assistant Attorney General Tony West Announce 
Process to Resolve Discrimination Claims of Hispanic and Women Farmers (Feb. 25, 
2011) http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2011/03/0100.xml. 
(last visited on Aug. 22, 2015). 
417 News Release No. 0024.12, USDA Office of Communications, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack 
Announces Updated and Improved Process to Resolve Discrimination Claims of Hispanic and Wom-
en Farmers (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=
2012/01/0024.xml  (last visited on Aug. 22, 2015). 
418 Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims, Defendant’s Eighth Status Rept., 
Exh. Garcia v. Vilsack, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.
farmerclaims.gov/Documents/USDA%20Framework%20011312%20Final.pdf (last visit-
ed Aug. 2, 2015)); see also Cantu v. United States, 565 F. App’x 7, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(reversing dismissal of claim of discrimination in making settlement offer). 
419 Id. at 9. 
420 See CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 8. 
421 See Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process §§ V. D., IV, VII. C., VII.C. 
(explaining procedures). 
422 See id. § XI. 
423 Id. § I.E. (providing further that USDA would pay administrative costs of the Claims Pro-
cess). 
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gram:  the number of claimants was not known and a substantial final 
payout in the cases was unlikely.  First, when Secretary Tom Vilsack 
announced the Hispanic and women farmers’ settlement process on 
February 25, 2010, the government did not know how many claimants 
there would be.  At a status conference the previous week, govern-
ment counsel had pressed plaintiffs’ counsel in Garcia for the number 
of Hispanic claimants, noting that their allegations had ranged from 
20,000, to 50, to 82,000, to 16,000.424  In September 2010, the gov-
ernment still did not have that information.425  Second, no class was 
certified.  In Pigford, class certification had been a key factor in the 
government’s decision to settle that lawsuit.426  By contrast, in both 
Garcia and Love certification was denied, making the prospect of size-
able adverse judgments remote.427  The government’s interest in vol-
untarily settling thousands of claims was not anticipated by the court, 
“given the history of the case.”428  Nevertheless, in 2010 the govern-
ment created “what it’s calling an ‘Administrative Claims Program’” 
as a “voluntary alternative to litigation” available to all Hispanic and 
women farmers, not just those in contact with the Garcia and Love at-
torneys.429 
From all appearances, politics provided a key motivation for crea-
tion of the Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process.  Following 
the Pigford II settlement the Administration was under intense pres-
sure from congressional leaders and Secretary Vilsack to compensate 
Hispanic farmers in a similar manner.430  Eight senators sent Presi-
dent Obama a letter noting that “approximately $2.25 billion” had 
been allotted to “resolve USDA discrimination against black farmers” 
 
424 Status Conf. at 5, 10, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010) (reasoning 
that without “a solid number” a government settlement proposal would be “shooting in 
the dark”). 
425 Def. Status Rept. at 2, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2010) (noting 
that plaintiffs’ counsel had identified only the eighty-one plaintiffs named in the Com-
plaint). 
426 CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 6 (noting that “approval of class certifica-
tion . . . appears to have been a critical factor in the decision” to settle); see Carpen-
ter, supra note 348, at 15–16 (describing class certification as an “important development” 
that “paved the way” for the settlement). 
427 See Gant, supra note 398, at 249 (noting that in class action litigation “denial of certifica-
tion often means the end of the case”). 
428 Status Conf. at 11–12, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010) (detailing 
the comment of Judge James Robertson). 
429 Status Conf. at 10–12, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (quoting 
government counsel). 
430 See Burger, supra note 415 (illustrating political pressure on Congress and Secretary Vil-
sack); LaFraniere, supra note 337 (same). 
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and calling for equal treatment for Hispanic farmers and ranchers.431  
Hispanic and female farmers sought treatment “on par with other vic-
tims of discrimination.”432  The Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims 
Process was reportedly molded at White House meetings433 over the 
strong objections of career lawyers who argued, inter alia, “that the 
legal risks did not justify the costs.”434  The creation of the Claims 
Process and the Keepseagle settlement were seen by people in the Ad-
ministration as “providing ‘a way to neutralize the argument that the 
government favors black farmers over Hispanic, Native American or 
women farmers’” and to court key constituencies.435 
The Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process was created by 
the executive branch without legislative input or judicial supervision.  
The Process is a new federal administrative claims program436 that 
gives federal cash benefits to particular individuals. While the Presi-
dent can create commissions to hear claims and disburse money, that 
money cannot come from the Judgment Fund unless its statutory re-
quirements are met.437  It is a close question whether funding the 
Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process meets the Judgment 
Fund’s statutory requirements, given the government’s small litigative 
risk and the Process’s inclusion of claimants who had made no claims 
and were not in touch with the Garcia or Love attorneys.438 
 
431 Letter from Robert Menendez, Senator, to Barack Obama, President (June 17, 2009),  
http://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/senators-urge-settlement-in-usda-
discrimination-lawsuit-by-hispanic-farmers (detailing senators’ requests for equal treat-
ment of Hispanic farmers and ranchers). 
432 Ben Evans, USDA Offers $1.3B To Settle Discrimination Complaints from Women, Latino Farmers, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (May 26, 2010) (quoting attorney for Hispanic farmers), 
http://business.gaeatimes.com/2010/05/26/ap-source-usda-offers-13b-to-settle-
discrimination-complaints-from-women-latino-farmers-64864/. 
433 See generally LaFraniere, supra note 337 (describing the White House’s involvement in 
shaping the claims process); see also Burger, supra note 415, (quoting an Obama admin-
istration official who described the White House as playing a “coordinating role”). 
434 See LaFraniere, supra note 337, at 3 (noting lawyers’ objection to the process). 
435 See id. (quoting an administration official). 
436 The parties clearly understood that USDA had created a new program.  See e.g., Status 
Conf. at 3, 5, 10, 11, 14, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2012) (collo-
quy among court and counsel for both sides); Status Conf. at 10–12, Garcia v. Veneman, 
1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (government counsel using term “Administrative 
Claims Program”). 
437 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 
908 (2007) (explaining that restrictions on use of the Judgment Fund would undercut 
any presidentially created causes of action, as “there might be no pot of money from 
which to fund damages”). 
438 See supra notes 141–49, 424–29 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Lack of Transparency 
There is little public information about payments from the Judg-
ment Fund or reimbursements to it.  There is no readily available way 
to find what Judgment Fund payments have been made to a particu-
lar claimant or because of a specific incident.439  The Bureau of Fiscal 
Services, the component of the Department of the Treasury respon-
sible for the Judgment Fund,440 does provide three categories of in-
formation, but each has limited usefulness. 
First, pursuant to an Office of Personnel Management regulation, 
Fiscal Services publishes an annual No FEAR Non-Compliant Agency 
Report identifying agencies that failed to timely reimburse the Judg-
ment Fund for No FEAR Act payments.441  That regulation requires 
that the record “be eliminated no later than the next annual posting” 
once the agency pays.442  Little substantive information is provided; 
the Annual Non-Compliant Agency Report available in May, 2015, 
stated in its entirety, “No federal agencies were found to be non-
compliant as of November 1, 2014.”443 
Second, Fiscal Services also posts on its website the balances cur-
rently owed by various agencies to the Judgment Fund for No FEAR 
Act and Contract Disputes Act reimbursements.444  The information is 
transient.  No records are kept or method provided to track agencies 
that are frequently late in reimbursing the Fund.445  Congress is not 
informed of which agencies fall behind in their CDA payments.446 
 
439 See Greene, supra note 9 (noting lack of transparency). 
440 This function was formerly handled by Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS). 
441 See Office of Pers. Mgmt. Reimbursement of Judgment Fund, 5 C.F.R. § 724.105 (provid-
ing that “[a]n agency’s failure to reimburse the Judgment Fund . . . will be recorded on 
an annual basis and posted on the FMS Web site.”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 724.104(b) (provid-
ing that agencies are to reimburse the Judgment Fund or “make arrangements in writing 
for reimbursement” within forty-five days of receiving notice from FMS).  The No FEAR 
Non-Compliant Agency Report can be found at http://www.fms.treas.gov/judgefund/
noncompliance.htm. 
442 5 C.F.R. § 724.105. 
443 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY:  BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, https://
www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/jdgFund/noncompliance.htm (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2015) (illustrating a lack of information on non-compliance).  On July 11, 2014, 
the Treasury’s website provided only the Annual Non-Compliant Agency Report for 2012, 
which stated in its entirety, “No federal agencies were found to be non-compliant as of 
November 1, 2012.” 
444 See No FEAR Act Receivables, TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/
reports/tma/nofear.htm (providing agency balances); Contract Disputes Receivables, 
TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/tma/contractdisputes.
htm (same). 
445 See Sarah Wood Borak, Note, The Legacy of “Deep Throat”:  The Disclosure Process of the Whis-
tleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
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Finally, Treasury has posted on its website databases containing 
some information about Judgment Fund payments.  It posted Judg-
ment Fund Transparency Reports to Congress for 2009 through 
2014.447  It did so in response to the House managers of the Financial 
Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2012 who 
sought public disclosure of information about Judgment Fund pay-
ments, including plaintiffs’ names, attorneys’ names, and the facts 
giving rise to each claim.448  These Treasury reports are spreadsheets 
showing payments made from the Judgment Fund from October 1 to 
September 30 of the year of the report, with columns identifying the 
defendant agency, “Plaintiff’s Counsel,” “Payment Amount,” and the 
principal statutory basis for the claim.449  Treasury has posted a similar 
database for years 2003–2013.450  The Judgment Fund Transparency 
Reports do not include all the information requested by the House 
managers, such as the identity of plaintiffs, the facts regarding any 
claim or, in some instances, the attorneys.451  Treasury’s reasoning for 
withholding names of plaintiffs and some attorneys is reflected in the 
 
617, 654 (2005) (noting that “the [No FEAR] reimbursement process may extend over 
several years”). 
446 See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 11 (showing a lack of agency specific information 
requirement). 
447 Cong. Report, 2012 Judgment Fund Transparency Report to Cong., BUREAU OF THE 
FISCAL SERVICE [hereinafter 2012 Judgment Fund Report]; Cong. Report, 2011 Judgment 
Fund Transparency Report to Cong., BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, [hereinafter 2011 
Judgment Fund Report], http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/jdgFund/
congress-reports.htm. 
448 See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 15 n.130.  The managers directed that 
[u]nless the disclosure of such information is otherwise prohibited by law or court 
order, the report shall consist of:  (1) the name of the plaintiff or claimant; (2) the 
name of the counsel for the plaintiff or claimant; (3) the name of the agency that 
submitted the claim; (4) a brief description of the facts that gave rise to the claim; 
and (5) the amount paid representing principal, attorney fees, and interest, if ap-
plicable. 
  H.R. REP. NO. 112-136, at 6 (2011).  The same language was used the next year regarding 
the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Bill, 2013.  H.R. REP. NO. 
112-550, at 6 (2012); CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 15.  Similar language was 
included in 2013 and 2014, for the Financial Services and General Government Appro-
priations Bills of 2014 and 2015; H.R. REP. NO. 113-172, at 14–15 (2013); H.R. REP. NO. 
113-508, at 14 (2014). 
449 E.g., 2011 Judgment Fund Report; 2012 Judgment Fund Report.  Other columns include 
“Attorney’s Fees Amount,” “Cost Amount,” and “Interest Amount.”  Id. 
450 See JUDGMENT FUND PAYMENT SEARCH PAGE, https://jfund.fms.treas.gov/
jfradSearchWeb/JFPymtSearchAction.do (providing a database of Judgment Fund pay-
ments).  The Treasury provides the information explicitly “for the purpose of tracking 
the status of approved Judgment Fund payments only.”  Id.  This database lacks a “Plain-
tiff’s Counsel” column.  Id. 
451 2011 and 2012 Judgment Fund Reports.  But see CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 
15 (stating incorrectly that the reports contained all information requested by the House 
managers other than fact summaries). 
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agency’s denial of a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) appeal 
seeking that information.  The agency concluded that “disclosing the 
names of individuals who received payments from the Judgment 
Fund would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.”452  The agency took a similar position “where the attorney is a 
sole practitioner and the payment is exclusively for attorney fees.”453  
In FOIA responses the agency disclosed documents that identified 
courts, docket numbers, underlying facts, the names of plaintiffs who 
were not individuals, and the law firms and lawyers who were not sole 
practitioners.454 
In 1995 Congress repealed the requirement of an annual report 
on the fees and expenses paid under EAJA.455  No statute now re-
quires agencies or the executive branch to report EAJA payments 
made in either administrative or judicial proceedings.456  Consequent-
ly, there is data on the amounts paid under that act from 1982 to 
1994,457 but a remarkable paucity of information about EAJA pay-
ments made since then.458  Reports from different agencies about the 
same EAJA payments may be conflicting.459  Even when the GAO per-
formed detailed audits of specific agencies it was unable to ascertain 
all EAJA fees paid on account of those agencies.460  Its in-depth report 
 
452 See Letter from Bureau of the Fiscal Service, to Paul Figley, Associate Director, Legal 
Rhetoric Program, Washington College of Law (June 18, 2014), 2 (on file with the au-
thor) (demonstrating the agency’s refusal to disclose individual payment recipients). 
453 See id. at 3. 
454 See documents released by the Dep’t of Treasury in response to FOIA # 2014-03-086 and 
FOIA # 2013-10-20 (on file with the author). 
455 See supra notes 261–62. 
456 See GAO-11-650, supra note 321, at 12 n.21. 
457 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-68R, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 
11–13 (1998) [hereinafter GAO/HEHS 98-68R] (noting that during fiscal years 1982–
1994 there were approximately 8,400 EAJA applications of which 6,200 were granted at a 
cost of about $34 million).  But see id. at 2 (noting that data from fiscal years 1982–94 
could not be verified because government-wide EAJA data was no longer collected and 
agency recordkeeping had been lax). 
458 See, e.g., Admin. Conference of the U.S., Report of the Chairman on Agency and Court 
Awards in FY 2010 under the Equal Access to Justice Act 5–6 (2013) (noting problems in 
acquiring useful data); Baier, supra note 226, at 43 (same); Korpics et al., supra note 229, 
at 10998 (same). 
459 See Mortimer & Malmsheimer, supra note 226, at 353–54 (noting disparities in amounts of 
reported Forest Service EAJA fees from 1999–2005 in information provided by the Forest 
Service ($6,137,583), the Department of Justice ($3,526,632), and the Secretary of Agri-
culture ($7,002,530)). 
460 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-458T, LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON 
USDA ATTORNEY FEE CLAIMS AND PAYMENTS 1, 6 (2014) (noting that 29 of 33 USDA 
agencies did not track and could not provide relevant data); GAO-11-650 at 2–3, 33 (not-
ing incomplete nature of EPA, Treasury, and DOJ records on costs associated with envi-
ronmental litigation). 
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on USDA and Interior agencies concluded that they had “no way to 
readily determine who made claims, the total amount each depart-
ment paid or awarded in attorney fees, who received the payments, or 
the statutes under which the cases were brought for the claims.”461  
Members of both sides in environmental litigation recognize the 
need for accurate information about EAJA payments.462 
There is very little public information about outcomes of the His-
panic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process.  Unlike Pigford I, Pigford II, 
and Keepseagle, no information is available about the number of 
claims filed; the total amounts paid on claims, costs, or attorneys’ 
fees; or how much money remains in the Settlement Fund.  The 
deadline for filing claims passed on May 1, 2013.  While the Frame-
work required the Adjudicator to “[i]ssue periodic reports to USDA 
on the progress of the Claims Process and the results of adjudica-
tions,” it did not mandate public reports.463  None have been made by 
the Adjudicator or USDA. USDA has said only that, “As of September 
2015, the Claims Administrator has scheduled payments to more than 
2,500 claimants.”464 
Keeping Judgment Fund payments secret has adverse conse-
quences.  Treasury’s Judgment Fund data cannot be matched with 
other agencies’ data because it does not include common identifi-
ers.465  As a consequence, agencies cannot assess whether proposed 
compromises are reasonable compared to similar cases.466  Likewise, 
the absence of specific information on EAJA payments makes it prob-
lematic for Congress to make rational choices about changing that 
 
461 GAO 12-417R at 5; accord Paul Verkuil, Report of the Chairman on Agency and Court Awards in 
FY 2010 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Admin. Conference of the United States 4–6 
(Jan. 9, 2013) (noting the extreme difficulty of collecting data on EAJA payments from 
agencies). 
462 See Baier, supra note 226, at 35, 43 (noting problems caused by termination of reporting); 
Korpics et al., supra note 229, at 10998 (recognizing that some environmentalists would 
support restoration of EAJA reporting requirements). 
463 Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process, supra note 421, Sec. IV. 
464 Hispanic and Women Farmers and Ranchers Claims Resolution Process, Home, Update, 
https://www.farmerclaims.gov/Default.aspx.  If each of the 2,500 claimants received the 
maximum $250,000 award, total payments would be $625,000,000.  See supra note 419 and 
accompanying text.  To finance the program, $1,330,000,000 was taken from the Judg-
ment Fund.  See supra note 415  and accompanying text.  Subtracting the payments from 
the corpus leaves at least $705,000,000 of Judgment Fund money unaccounted for.  As 
with the Keepseagle settlement, less than half the money has gone to pay claims.  See supra 
note 408 and accompanying text. 
465 See GAO-14-458T, supra note 460, at 10 n.23 (noting problem). 
466 See id. at 9–10 (discussing awards for attorneys’ fees and costs). 
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statute,467 and leaves the public in the dark about the size and fre-
quency of substantial government payments and the patterns in 
which they are awarded.468  The lack of an accessible database of 
Judgment Fund payments and their recipients makes it difficult to 
check whether claimants have previously recovered for the same inju-
ries.469 
On a broader level, maintaining the fog around Judgment Fund 
payments undercuts the transparency that makes for better govern-
ment.470  As Professor Cass Sunstein observed, “[i]f information is 
kept secret, public deliberation cannot occur; the risks of self-
interested representation and factional tyranny increase dramatical-
ly.”471  No strong governmental interest supports keeping Judgment 
Fund information secret.472  Routine disclosure of Judgment Fund 
payments would have the benefits of facilitating fact-based “citizen 
deliberation” and review of government expenditures; furthering 
“checks and balances” by providing specific, detailed information by 
which Congress and the public could assess executive branch settle-
ments and judicial branch judgments; and using the disinfecting sun-
light of disclosure to discourage payments grounded in “illegitimate 
or irrelevant considerations.”473 
The public has a right, grounded in the common law and the First 
Amendment, to access all final judgments and court decisions.474  
Treasury’s practice of withholding case names, claimant’s names, and 
fact summaries from its Judgment Fund databases makes that infor-
 
467 See, e.g., Interior FY 2011 Budget Hrg., supra note 322, at 363 (noting, according to Rep. 
Simpson, the inability to find any accounting of payments); Korpics et al., supra note 229, 
at 10998. 
468 See supra note 462 and accompanying text; see also Baier, supra note 226, at 35 (noting dif-
ficulty of assessing “amounts of EAJA awards or the patterns of EAJA use”). 
469 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-69R, CIVIL RIGHTS:  ADDITIONAL ACTIONS 
IN PIGFORD II CLAIMS PROCESS COULD REDUCE RISK OF IMPROPER DETERMINATION 3 
(2012). 
470 See Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 232, 239 (2008) (“[Transparency] inhibits corruption, encourages accountabil-
ity, and instills public confidence.”). 
471 Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 894 (1986). 
472 See id. at 895–96 (noting that secrecy is appropriate to protect military plans, facilitate 
negotiations, facilitate internal government deliberations, avoid interest group pressures, 
and “encourag[e] communications from others”). 
473 See id. at 896–97 (listing categories of benefits from disclosure). 
474 Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court:  The Case Against Gov-
ernment-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 740 (2004) (citing Nixon v. Warner 
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)); see also Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the 
Courthouse:  Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177, 206 (2009) (noting that 
that judicial rulings have been open to the public both “at common law, and for most of 
this nation’s history”). 
206 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
mation difficult to collect in the aggregate, although that information 
is readily retrievable on a case by case basis for matters in litigation via 
PACER by anyone who knows the parties’ names or the docket num-
ber.475  Indeed, in response to FOIA requests for information about 
particular items in the annual Judgment Fund databases, Treasury 
discloses transmittal documents and court pleadings that contain 
docket numbers from which names and details can be obtained with 
a few mouse clicks.476  Requiring the public to file a FOIA request to 
get a docket number to use in PACER to find a plaintiff’s name or 
complaint is akin to making records available only in one remote 
government file room.477  This sort of run-around is inconsistent with 
the Administration’s Open Government Directive that calls for proac-
tive dissemination of useful information, without “waiting for specific 
requests under FOIA,” “online in an open format that can be re-
trieved, downloaded, indexed, and searched by commonly used web 
search applications.”478 
There is even more reason for easy public access when individuals, 
groups, or entities receive government funds.  The Statement and 
Account Clause of the Constitution directs that “a regular Statement 
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money 
shall be published from time to time.”479  There is a long history of 
 
475 Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) is the federal judiciary’s online 
public access system and is available at https://www.pacer.gov.  Information pertaining to 
administrative settlements is similarly available to the public only when settlements fall 
within a judicial process such as court approval of a minor’s settlement. 
476 See supra note 454 and accompanying text. 
477 See Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 387 
(2013) (“‘Transparency’ or ‘access’ does not really exist if obtaining and securing infor-
mation is costly in either time or effort.”).  Professor Candeub notes that the 2013 
amendment of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 changed the 
requirement that information about securities transactions of federal officials be posted 
online to a requirement that it be “available on paper but only in the basement of the 
Cannon House Office Building.”  Id. at 391–92. 
478 Open Government Directive:  Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and 
Agencies from Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget 2 (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.treasury.gov/open/Documents/m10-06.pdf; see also Candeub, supra note 
477, at 407 (discussing Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
Cass Sunstein’s call for “agencies to provide information ‘in an open format that enables 
the public to download, analyze, and visualize any information and data.’” (citing Memo-
randum for the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and Agencies from Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Of-
fice of Mgmt. and Budget 1 (Apr. 25, 2011))). 
479 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  While some courts have held that names of claimants may be 
protected from disclosure under FOIA, they have done so without addressing the State-
ment and Account Clause.  See, e.g., News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 
1173, 1189, 1196–97, 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding names of individuals who re-
ceived disaster assistance could be withheld under FOIA but their addresses must be dis-
closed, and noting “the release of a list of names and other identifying information does 
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disclosure of names and amounts paid to those who sought private 
bills from Congress.480  As a matter of policy the Department of Justice 
will not agree to settlements or consent decrees that contain confi-
dentiality provisions.481  While that policy allows rare exceptions, they 
“must be considered in the context of the public’s strong interest in 
knowing about the conduct of its Government and expenditure of its 
resources.”482  There is little reason to keep successful claimants from 
being identified as successful claimants.  As Judge Joseph F. Anderson 
observed in the context of confidentiality provisions, “the desire to 
protect someone from relatives, telemarketers, and burglars could al-
so be used to keep secret the names of the winners of state-run lotter-
ies.  Yet no one would seriously argue that the names of lottery win-
ners should be shrouded in secrecy enforced by the government.”483 
IV.  POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDGMENT FUND PRACTICES 
A.  Limit Executive Branch Use of the Judgment Fund to Create New Claims 
Programs & Processes 
The current Judgment Fund regime has worked fairly well.  Con-
gress has given the executive branch broad discretion to decide how 
to litigate claims, when to appeal, and whether to settle.  When cases 
or settlements are final, payments are promptly made.  There have 
been very few controversies. 
As a practical matter, there is no effective way for anyone outside 
the executive branch to monitor specific litigation decisions or set-
tlements for impropriety or political favoritism.484  Such matters are 
necessarily complex and confidential.  Judges are hardly in a position 
to evaluate and report on whether government attorneys are too soft 
in negotiating a particular settlement or arguing a case.485  Nor is the 
legislative branch well suited to investigate such matters in individual 
 
not inherently . . . constitute a ‘clearly unwarranted’ invasion of personal privacy” (citing 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6))). 
480 See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text. 
481 28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (“This policy flows from the principle of openness in govern-
ment . . . .”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (“Policy with regard to open judicial proceedings.”). 
482 28 C.F.R. § 50.23; see also Cheit, supra note 468, at 264–65 (noting the need for transpar-
ency in government tort settlements). 
483 Anderson, supra note 474, at 740. 
484 See Peterson, supra note 289, at 368 (noting that the Department of Justice “is the only 
effective check on itself”). 
485 Id. at 369.  But see Cantu, 565 F. App’x at 9–10 (directing court to review whether a settle-
ment offer was tainted by discrimination). 
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cases.486  Indeed, congressional attempts to assess whether specific set-
tlements are too high could draw Congress back into the quagmire of 
the legislative claims system.487 
The Administration’s use of the Judgment Fund to create the 
Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process without an appropria-
tion488 and to enter the Keepseagle settlement does raise other issues.  
Should the Judgment Fund be available to fund new administrative 
claims programs created by the executive branch without legislation, 
judicial supervision, or congressional supervision?489  Should it be 
used to endow huge class settlement systems that may spend more 
than half the allotted money on purposes other than compensation 
of claimants?490  Congress might consider prohibiting such uses of the 
Judgment Fund.491  If Congress fails to act, it is likely that another 
administration will create comparable claims programs or enter simi-
lar, open-ended class settlements; it is easier for the executive branch 
to act within its arguable discretion than to persuade Congress to ap-
propriate money. 
B.  Increase Transparency 
1.  Publish Judgment Fund Payments 
Congress should require public disclosure of detailed information 
on all Judgment Fund payments.  As suggested by the House manag-
ers of the Financial Services and General Government Appropria-
tions Acts of 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015492 and sponsors of the Judg-
ment Fund Transparency Act,493 Congress should require that 
 
486 See Peterson, supra note 289, at 370–71 (explaining that neither congressional committees 
nor the Government Accountability Office would do so effectively). 
487 See supra Parts I.A–C. 
488 See News Transcript, Release No. 0629.10, USDA Office of Communications, Media Con-
ference Call on 2010 Farm Income Forecasts, Trade, Statistics and Final Passage of Pig-
ford II Settlement (Dec. 1, 2010) http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/
usdahome?contentid=2010/12/0629.xml&navid=Recovery_News&edeployment_action
=retrievecontent (Sec. Vilsack explained that unlike in Pigford II, “we don’t have to have 
an appropriation from Congress for Garcia/Love”). 
489 See supra notes 424–35 and accompanying text. 
490 See supra notes 402–08 and accompanying text. 
491 Such a limit might provide a new subsection (a)(4) to 31 U.S.C. § 1304, stating, “but, no 
payment shall be made on a settlement exceeding $500,000,000 that does not arise from 
a single event.” 
492 See supra note 447 and accompanying text. 
493 See, e.g., Judgment Fund Transparency Act of 2015, S. 350, 114th Cong. (2015); see also 
Government Transparency and Recordkeeping Act of 2012, S. 3415, 112th Congress § 2 
(2011–12). 
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Treasury post annual reports on the internet detailing information 
about each Judgment Fund payment.  The posted information 
should include for each payment the agency involved; the names of 
the claimants or plaintiffs and their attorneys; the amount paid, sepa-
rately listing attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest; a summary of the 
facts; and, if the matter was in litigation, the case name, docket num-
ber, and court.494  This information is readily available; agencies pro-
vide it (other than the summary) to Treasury when they submit 
claims or judgments for payment.495  A one-sentence fact summary 
could easily be included in the agency submission.  Any legislation 
should provide that “except with regard to children under eighteen, 
the disclosure of information required in this section shall not be 
considered a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ for 
purposes of Title 5, United States Code.”  Such a provision is neces-
sary to insure that Treasury does not withhold this information under 
FOIA precedents.496 
2. Restore EAJA Reporting Requirements
Congress should restore the EAJA reporting requirements as sug-
gested in the Open Book on Equal Access to Justice Act.497  This 
would require the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States to make an annual report to Congress on EAJA pay-
ments and to post online a database containing for each administra-
tive award case names, agencies involved, a description of the claim, 
the name of the party who received the award, the amount paid, and 
“[t]he basis for the finding that the position of the agency concerned 
was not substantially justified.”498  For awards made in litigation the 
bill requires posting of similar information and disclosure of amounts 
paid from the Judgment Fund, the amount of attorney fees, and the 
statute under which suit was filed.499  Agency heads would be required 
to provide pertinent information.500 
494 See generally Judgment Fund Transparency Act of 2015 § 2. 
495 See supra notes 452, 474 and accompanying text; BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., JUDGMENT 
FUND CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/
jdgFund/congress-reports.htm. 
496 See supra notes 453–55 and accompanying text. 
497 Open Book on Equal Access to Justice Act, H.R. 384, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Open 
Book on Equal Access to Justice Act, H.R. 2919, 113th Cong. (2014); Open EAJA Act of 
2010, H.R. 4717, 111th Cong. (2010). 
498 H.R. 2919 § 2(a).
499 Id. § 2(b). 
500 Id. § 2(a)–(b). 
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3.  Publish Reports on CDA and No FEAR Reimbursements 
Congress should require annual reports from Treasury that identi-
fy month by month information on which agencies were behind on 
CDA and No FEAR Act Judgment Fund reimbursement obligations.  
The practice of posting current balances is of no use in assessing 
which agencies have repeatedly missed payments or whether there is 
an ongoing problem with delays.  GAO has recommended annual re-
ports to Congress on amounts owed on CDA payments, recognizing 
that Treasury already supplies that information to OMB.501  The now-
required No FEAR Annual Non-Compliant Agency Report provides 
little information when posted and disappears shortly thereafter.502 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’s power of the purse gives it primary authority over the 
payment of claims against the government, but a legislative body is ill-
suited to decide individual claims.  Congress learned that its attempts 
to resolve such claims yielded bad results and required more time 
and attention than could be rationally spent on the process.  Over the 
years it made a number of decisions to have claims decided by the 
other, better-suited branches of government and to reduce the ad-
ministrative and procedural burdens of approving, funding, and re-
cording those payments.  The cumulative effect of those decisions is 
that Congress has lost both control over the payment of claims and 
the ability to ascertain what claims have been paid or their source of 
payment. 
The Judgment Fund functions as Congress intended on individual 
judgments and settlements, promptly paying them without unneces-
sary paperwork or processes.  Congressional trust in executive branch 
attorneys to protect the Fund seems to be well-founded.  The Obama 
Administration’s use of the Judgment Fund to finance a new claims 
program created without congressional approval or oversight, howev-
er, opens a different chapter.  If Congress does not act to limit such 
uses, it is fair to anticipate that similar claims programs will be creat-
ed without congressional input and funded by the Judgment Fund. 
Congressional decisions to cut back on requirements for reports 
and publication of government payments were made before wide-
 
501 See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 11. 
502 See supra notes 441–43 and accompanying text; BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., ANNUAL 
NON-COMPLIANT AGENCY REPORT, http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/
jdgFund/noncompliance.htm. 
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spread use of the internet.  Online publication of readily available in-
formation about Judgment Fund payments would be relatively simple 
and inexpensive.  That publication would serve the public interest by 
increasing the transparency of government payments to particular 
claimants and by providing information that Congress and the public 
could use to assess if the claims system is working as it should, and 
whether legislative changes should be made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
